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Bakyt Beshimov: 
“Kyrgyzstan is an intriguing 
country in post-Soviet Central 
Asia. The historical drama of 
the country is full of confl icts 
and crucial plots, mysteries 
and myths; it has more 
questions than answers. It is 
the most open country in the 
region, with strong civil society 
and freedom of speech. At 
the same time, it is the most 
disorganized country, with 
weak government institutions 
and an ineffi cient bureaucratic 
system.” – p. 2
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-2-
Kyrgyz Crossword
K
Y
R
G
Y
ZS
TA
N
 B
R
IE
F 
  I
ss
ue
 №
 7
Kyrgyzstan is an intriguing country in post-So-
viet Central Asia. The Historical drama of the coun-
try is full of confl icts and crucial plots, mysteries 
and myths; it has more questions than answers. 
It is the most open country in the region, with strong 
civil society and freedom of speech. At the same time, 
it is the most disorganized country, with weak govern-
ment institutions and an ineffi  cient bureaucratic system. 
According to many experts, the country essentially did 
not realize itself as a state during fi fteen years of indepen-
dence. It still has not clearly found its position concern-
ing main internal and external vectors of development. 
Among the former Soviet states of Central Asia, Kyr-
gyzstan was the fi rst to introduce a national currency, 
entere the WTO, and started land privatization. How-
ever, the advantages of some of these steps are not 
obvious. The economy is weak and vulnerable to seri-
ous external factors, and is damaged by corruption in 
addition. The government indeed cannot manage its 
huge external dept, which is why it fully depends on 
donor countries and international fi nancial institutions. 
Smart and dynamic Kyrgyz businessmen currently oc-
cupy medium and small businesses niches in Kazakh-
stan and Russia, leaving far behind the active part of 
the population in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in under-
standing the mechanisms of the market economy. 
Most working age citizens are massively leaving the 
country in search of a better life. Thanks to their remit-
tances, which annually amount to more than $500 mil-
lion, economic and social projects in the country con-
tinue to exist, and are even developing in some cases. 
The population is strongly politicized; the most ac-
tive part of it constantly participates in mass po-
litical events and does not allow the establishment 
of an authoritarian regime. In 2005, it became the 
only country in Central Asia to replace the system 
of rule by forceful pressure; it oddly presents ele-
ments of revolution and counterrevolution, coupe 
d’etat and constitutional transfer of authority. 
The nation is divided into two regions in political terms, 
but is united in the strive for better changes. The eco-
nomically active population feeds the authority, and 
has lost all hopes of getting help from them in return. 
The authority steadily increases its level of life at the ex-
pense of the population, not understanding how to help 
people substantially. Kyrgyzstan is a country of para-
doxes in which many unexpected things could happen.
KYRGYZ CROSSWORD 
Bakyt Beshimov, Vice-President of the American University-Central Asia
A Country of Paradoxes
The Lessons of the Last Fifteen Years and of 2005 
During the fi rst years of independence, it was 
generally believed that the country took a route for 
welfare, and expectations were high. The participa-
tion of people in political and economic life became 
more and more active, resulting in the emergence 
of opposition and establishment of a private sector. 
However, there was an attempt to establish clan-based 
rule of one family at the top instead of promoting system-
atic and consistent transformation of the political sys-
tem with an objective to increase the effi  ciency of gov-
ernance as a whole. Naturally, this occurrence prompt-
ed the appearance of three threatening trends: 1) the 
growth of corruption in the governmental system and 
system of public aff airs management, 2) the intensifi ca-
tion of crisis between the executive branch of authority 
and the parliament, 3) the moral and professional degra-
dation of the prestige of the judicial branch of authority. 
The shadow economy became almost equal to the of-
fi cial one. The arrogant and empty way of life of cor-
rupt offi  cials and new bourgeoisie promoted the 
quick defl ation of the moral values of the society, re-
sulting in the moral degradation of the population’s 
majority, who began to live according to the prin-
ciple that ‘everything can be bought and sold.’ The 
psychology of thieves, crooks and nepotistic lead-
ers became prevalent in the society. Elections at all 
levels turned into shameless exchanges, opening 
a way to politicians without morality or principles. 
By 2005, the country had a permanent presi-
dent and had gone through many prime min-
isters, speakers, and oppositional politicians, 
but had never seen a true leader of the nation. 
It is necessary to stress that the factor of leader-
ship plays a decisive role in the destiny of any coun-
try. The history of both successful and failed coun-
tries proves this point, which can especially be 
seen in the history of post communist countries. 
After the collapse of the USSR, the soviet party nomen-
clatura was the only source from which to form a ruling 
circle. A split in the Kyrgyz Communist Party in 1991 
demonstrated that there was no strong leader, and re-
gionalist politics openly emerged in the arena. It is for 
this reason that a member of the mid-level nomencla-
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tura occupied the position of the presidency, someone 
who was able to mislead the public from the start by po-
sitioning himself as democrat and a progressive leader. 
On the sly of anticommunist rhetoric, the top of the 
nomenclatura was eliminated from political life and 
replaced by a rattling mix of blood relatives and repre-
sentatives of the academic nomenclatura intelligentsia. 
At the same time, the one and only criterion to get 
access to authority was full obedience and person-
al devotion to the president and his family. It is not 
surprising that this criterion became both a basis to 
reinforce family rule and a trend towards the deg-
radation of the ruling circle. Most people did not 
notice that the country fell deep in dept under the 
thick screen of loud promises and endless plans. 
The unique natural resources of Kyrgyzstan turned 
into objects of shameless exploitation, robbery, 
and means of trade for the ruling circle and its as-
sociates. The Kyrgyz opposition was formed un-
der conditions of growing discontent among the 
people with the method of rule and personal 
qualities of the president and his close associates. 
The fi rst group of opposition consisted of representatives 
of the intelligentsia, who began political activity during 
perestroika. The number of opposition later increased 
with the addition of representatives of marginal groups 
in the society. It seems that the social origin and level of 
political culture of the political elite gave birth to two 
types of opposition: ideological and pseudo opposition. 
Pseudo oppositionists grew only on the basis of bare 
protest against the owner of the White House and his 
policies. They were always driven by only bare inter-
ests – to get into authority themselves by any means. 
Their number continues to increase from time to time 
with the addition of those people who have been 
stripped of opportunities to get rich at the expense 
of other people, and have thus become exploited 
themselves. Moreover, these people did not pay spe-
cial attention to the doubtful origins of politicians’ 
money. Such politicians never possessed idealism. 
For this reason, it is no coincidence that some of them 
who have gained government power currently cannot 
change the essence of authority for the better; they are 
mirror refl ections of their rivals of yesterday. It is logical that 
the property of losers passed into the hands of winners. 
It is utopia to expect constructive politics in the form 
of alternative projects for the country’s development 
and positive ideology from pseudo oppositionists. 
In contrast, politicians who had certain a political phi-
losophy and democratic commitments were not able 
to connect their political goals with the hopes of sim-
ple people. Now they are desperately searching for a 
cure against regionalism in order to fi nd a way to reach 
the wider public. They have not succeeded in turn-
ing their ideology into a philosophy of the masses. 
Thus, Kyrgyz oppositionists, not having a clear po-
litical plan, unity, or solidarity on the basis of prin-
ciples, and also lacking a leader with fi rm democratic 
commitments, could not play a large historical role. 
When protesters brought them to the top of the po-
litical pyramid in March 2005, giving them a rare 
chance to become authors of a better history for 
people, they did not use it. After 24 March, 2005 the 
power of protesting people was not directed to-
wards progress. Great eff orts yielded little result…
Look back at the past  The Kyrgyz nation appeared in history as a union of tribes with an elected khan, the au-
thority of whom was not hereditary. Tribalism in the political life of the Kyrgyz people played a large role over a long 
period of time, and did not allow the creation of a centralized state. Ethnic unity and regionalism gained important 
meaning during a period in which the political struggles of the Kyrgyz entering into the sphere of infl uence of (and a 
system of relationships with) despotic oriental states. Russia used intertribal and regional contradictions as an instru-
ment of infl uence and colonial management. Soviet authority attempted to replace tribalism and regionalism with 
class struggle and to introduce an ideology of modernism into Kyrgyz society. However, it was not able to fully destroy 
remnants of the past. Tribalism has been reanimated in the years of independence, and manipulation by a regional 
factor has taken place for the sake of reinforcing personal power, instead of substantial attempts to unify the nation 
and search for nationwide ideology. Return to the spiritual ancestry and the roots of Kyrgyz statehood has remained 
in the shadow of greedy self-interests. In ideological terms, there is always a contest between truth-seekers like Tok-
togul and the high and mighty among the Kyrgyz people.
In 2005, political life did not fl ow in a new di-
rection of transfer from regionalism to ideologi-
cal contest in politics. Conservative thinking, in-
volving retrograded populism and world outlooks, 
and the political immaturity of political elite hin-
dered the country from progressive development. 
In many countries, progressive politicians, especially 
some outstanding leaders who had historically short 
terms, performed revolutions in the minds of their 
people and build a new beautiful world for all on that 
basis. Kyrgyzstan also has a chance, but the country is 
allowing it to pass. The system of governance remains 
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weak. The political system is in crisis. Confrontation be-
tween the executive branch of authority and the parlia-
ment have attained a permanent, dead-end character. 
The condition of the parliament discredits the model 
of a multiparty system and parliamentary form of rul-
ing in the eyes of the population. Corruption and inef-
fi cient management of public aff airs has destroyed the 
remaining hopes of the population after the change 
of authority. Neither the authority nor the opposi-
tion have a competent, consolidated position on any 
of the principal issue of national or foreign policy. The 
HIPC program demonstrates this state of aff airs best. 
People do not have a leader; they have a tandem. 
There is combative opposition, many-headed and 
many-voiced, which still does not know what kind of 
society to build. In short, the historical ancestry and 
future of the country, the hopes and expectations of 
people are in the hands of an immature political elite. 
What we can expect in the nearest future?
The situation in the country and the condition 
of its citizens will depend on the policy of the White 
House and opposition, as well as on the level of par-
ticipation in politics of the active part of society. Let us 
take a positive, desired scenario as an example – one 
which could be called the spurt forward-overcome 
model. The new Constitution has been adopted, and 
both sides agreed in general that this is a step forward. 
The executive branch of authority and the parlia-
ment will seriously start to reinforce the politi-
cal system and the basis of governmental author-
ity according to the new Constitution, smoothing 
the contradictions and optimizing mutual relations. 
At last, both sides will reach consensus in understanding 
the main directions in the development of the country. 
All politicians will become united and patriotic in lob-
bying the interests of nation, and will also clearly defi ne 
their roles in the process and assume mutual obliga-
tions to observe the clear rules of the game of politics. 
The opposition will acquire offi  cial political status and 
rights which are protected by laws, and will fi nally be-
come a signifi cant force in society. The body that will 
preside over reforms will consist of highly educated 
youth, honest professionals, and politicians. A real 
fi ght against corruption will begin, and stolen mon-
ey will be returned to the treasury of government. 
Economic freedom and effi  ciency will increase as the 
government promotes the growth of production, 
the expansion of exports, and the increase of goods 
turnover in the country. The government will set up 
a professional, non-confrontational foreign policy, 
achieve the understanding of donors, and take a favor-
able position on credit return. The advantages of this 
model are that it highlights a way to achieve system-
atic change and demolition of the conditions which 
give birth to self-interest and corruption. In addition, 
there are opportunities within the model for intellec-
tual and ideological competition, which will result in 
forwarding the opportunities of the best minds and 
characters in the system of governance and econom-
ics, while limiting those of untalented grey impostors 
and robbers. However, transition to and realization 
of this model require historical thinking, great po-
litical will and a strive to serve to one’s nation truly. 
The other model is negative, and more likely. Let us 
call it the full backtrack model. If we proceed from 
reasons, background and dynamics of May-November 
events of 2006, and analyze behavior of three main 
political forces in the country (executive branch and 
its parliament satellites, opposition and politically ac-
tive population), then grounds for the model’s realiza-
tion are more than enough. Main characteristics of the 
model are: a) full distrust between political opponents 
and scorn against each other; b) eff orts to undermine 
resources of opponents by any means using govern-
mental power mechanism; c) escalation of interregion-
al tension by intentional use population’s prejudices, 
exploitation of term of historical fairness and also par-
ity of presence in government; d) formation of support-
ers’ group on the grounds of regionalism. If the present 
parliament stops its work then the government will 
be in even more vulnerable position, the whole state 
authority will weaken, protest in politics will intensify 
manifold and all these may fi nally throw the country 
into chaos. Implementation of such kind policy will 
promote corruption in the economy, bandit redistri-
bution of property and gradual decay of fi nancial and 
investment system. A war of all against all in politics 
and economics will completely bring the country un-
der the control of donors, creditors, rich neighbors, and 
the current disputes about the HIPC will appear as a 
very minor issue. The continuing foreign policy based 
on preferences the country will be isolated from main 
international relations actors and political leadership 
of the country will lose credibility on the international 
arena. Intentional incitement of regional confronta-
tion, full fallback from sound compromise will results 
in forceful confrontation and separatism. The state au-
thority will collapse, the society will completely come 
apart and there will be a search for a new state com-
position, with active participation of other countries.
Intermediate Way to Nowhere model is also possible. 
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Political and Legal Analysis of the Changes in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic
There are also conditions for its realization. Mechani-
cally, the country moves in neither a good nor a bad 
direction, but somewhere in an unknown direction. 
Meanwhile, there is a lot of noise about imaginary suc-
cess. The authority imitates reforms and continues to 
bargain with donors, not having a clear perspective or 
fully understanding the consequences of the decisions 
that they take. They cannot pay the national dept, but 
at the same time, they are afraid of the HIPC Initiative. 
They keep the population ignorant about where and 
how credits disappear, and do not take real measures 
in the fi ght against corruption. The notion that ‘in Kyr-
gyzstan, only fools and lazy people do not steal’ will 
be even more topical. The moral degradation of the 
society will reinforce tensions and weaken govern-
ment institutions further. In foreign policy, tactics of 
preferences, sharahanie, and nonobservance of obli-
gations will only intensify the neurosis and irritation 
of important partners, and thus a serious problem will 
emerge with a trust defi cit. There will be  a strange 
parity in politics: the authority will have a desire to 
overcome the opposition, but in the end no power to 
do so, and the opposition will not have a clear under-
standing of what to do with this authority despite its 
criticism of the authority. The parliament, more dead 
than alive, will try to drag itself through until the end 
of the term. New youth leaders and lesser-known poli-
ticians will try to create an alternative to the author-
ity and opposition, hoping that existing elites will dis-
credit themselves totally in the eyes of public by the 
next elections. Thus, we can arrive at the same point in 
2009 as we reached in 2005 – running without moving. 
We choose, or we are chosen. 
Gulnara Iskakova, LLM, Associate Professor of Law, American University-Central Asia
As a result of the many Referendums on changes 
to the Constitution (1994, 1996, 1998 and 2003), the 
system of government in Kyrgyzstan has turned into 
an awkward and ugly monster, wherein the President 
concentrates the authority that normally belong to 
the Parliament, the Ministries, and the Judiciary in well 
functioning democratic countries. The system has not 
worked, and all hope revolves around its “repair.” There-
fore, the demand for constitutional reform became the 
core concern of all the street rallies and demonstra-
tions in 2005 and 2006. After ousting President Akaev, 
numerous eff orts and imitations of eff orts were under-
taken to draft a Constitution that would satisfy all ma-
jor politicians of our country. As a result of the pressure 
of rallies, which brought several thousand protesters to 
the streets in the beginning of November of this year, 
and the threat of a major destabilization in the country, 
the opposition and the President reach an agreement, 
and the Parliament hastily passed new Constitution.
These events demonstrate a very good advancement 
among our political elite. Firstly, the opposition sug-
gested rational, although somewhat undeveloped, 
ideas that should contribute to the modernization of 
our system (society and government). Unlike Tajikistan 
facing civil war, our opposition did not dictate which 
clan should rule, but rather suggested rational pro-
grammatic ideas for the whole country, i.e. not power 
for the sake of power but power for reforms, for public 
good. According to Weber’s widely recognized typol-
ogy of power, part of the political elite in our country 
– the opposition – grew from the revolutionary char-
ismatic type of leadership, wherein leaders rather than 
ideas are extolled, and developed into a modern, ra-
tional-legal Western type of power, in which binding 
ideas, rules and procedures govern, rather than people. 
Only this approach will lead to a legal state, protection 
of human rights, protection of private property, and 
diff erentiation between political power and private 
property (business). Secondly, the opposition demon-
strated its ability to use consensus-reaching legal tech-
nologies as a way to avoid violence while conducting 
reforms, and behaved in such a way that it guarded 
against political radicalism on the side of both parties.
However, the critical conditions surrounding the 
adoption of the new draft of the Constitution and 
the lack of expert assistance for the opposition 
during the drafting process have left their aff ect.
Positive Changes in the Constitution?
It is believed that the new Constitution contains 
many positive nuances, such as granting permission 
for dual citizenship, moving the function of the arrest 
of citizens from the prosecutor’s offi  ce to the courts, 
expanding of the terms for local judges from three to 
fi ve years during the fi rst term, and from seven to ten 
years for latter terms, and introducing a new body for 
selecting candidates for the position of judge – the 
National Council on Justice Aff airs (although chairs, 
deputies, and judges of local courts will now be ap-
pointed by the President only, while they used to be 
appointed with the approval of the Jogorku Kenesh).
Undoubtedly, a positive aspect of the new Constitution 
is a more powerful government (i.e. the Ministries), due 
to a wider elaboration of its competence: “The gov-
ernment shall resolve all issues of state governance 
excluding those authorities delegated to the compe-
Political and Legal Analysis of the Changes in the Constitution of the 
Kyrgyz Republic
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Political and Legal Analysis of the Changes in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic
tence of the President and the Jogorku Kenesh.” The 
President is now deprived from the right to chair dur-
ing meetings of the government or to cancel its regu-
lation. If the regulation of the government contradicts 
superior legislative acts, then this issue should either 
be resolved by the Government itself, or in the court.
The new Constitution excludes such luxuries of the 
old list of Presidential powers such as the appoint-
ment and dismissal of the heads of administrative 
units and local state administrations, the ability to cre-
ate and abolish the National Security Service, the abil-
ity to create and leader executive bodies beyond the 
government structure; the approval of single system 
of training, recruitment and funding of civil servants. 
However, these authorities were not transferred to the 
Prime Minister either. Therefore, if they are not men-
tioned in the Constitution, they might be assigned to 
the President in the laws. Moreover, all laws continue to 
function according to transitional clauses (see below).
Dismissal of the Parliament is now only related to 
the issue of trust in the government and formation 
of the government, whereas before the reasons for 
dismissing the Parliament were practically unlimited 
– the President could dissolve the Parliament in the 
event of any crisis caused by contradictions between 
the Jogorku Kenesh and any other branch of power. 
Here one can point out that the formation and dis-
missal of the government has been the usual cause 
of confl ict between the President and the Parliament.
The President can still pass decrees, but they will not 
have the force of a law as before – as in the case of the 
delegation of legislative authorities by the Parliament 
or the dismissal of Parliament. Now Presidential de-
crees should not contradict the laws of the Parliament; 
the Constitution eliminates delegation of authorities as 
well. These are positive changes. However, in systems 
where executive power is two-headed there is usually 
a law that Presidential acts should be signed by the 
Prime-Minister, because he who signs the decisions 
bares responsibility for preparing and implementing 
those decisions. The government does not need these 
decrees for state governance or the implementation of 
legislation; the government has apparatus for drafting 
such legislative acts. Sustaining two Apparatuses (that 
of the President and of the Government) is considered 
to be a luxury even for countries richer than Kyrgyzstan. 
Exclusion of an unprecedented threshold for over-
coming a Presidential veto (four-fi fths of he mem-
bers of Parliament) and of a ban for six months to a 
year on considering bills to which the President has 
objections are also positive changes. However, a re-
quirement of two-thirds of votes is still signifi cant. 
Therefore, it will still be diffi  cult for Parliament to 
pass a bill that does not suit the President. The presi-
dential veto is needed to keep the Parliament from 
making hasty decisions regarding draft legislation, 
but a simple majority for overcoming the presiden-
tial veto would be suffi  cient, since law passing is the 
main function of the Parliament and not the President.
Most importantly, the President can still independently 
call referenda, which allows him to make decisions or 
pass laws to which the Parliament, the legislative body, 
objects. Unlimited right of the President to initiate 
Referenda is not practiced anywhere else in the world 
outside of Kyrgyzstan, some NIS countries, and Sri Lan-
ka. This right is usually limited, or does not exist at all.
Some norms about authority of the President were sim-
ply transferred from the chapter on Presidential author-
ity to the chapter on executive or judicial power. Based 
on the new Constitution, the President recommends 
candidates for the position of the Chair and Deputy of 
the Constitutional and Supreme Courts to the Jogorku 
Kenesh, i.e. presidential authority is still there, but the list 
looks shorter in the chapter on Presidential Authority. 
Meanwhile, the mentioned authorities do not infl uence 
the nature of relationship between the President and the 
Parliament or the degree of their accountability to the 
public. Selection and implementation of the conceptu-
ally integral approach is more important than the num-
ber of authorities of the President in the Constitution.
Challenges and Solutions for Systems with Popularly
-Elected Presidents
The main issue with a popularly-elected Presidents 
lies in the confl icts between the President and the 
Parliament, because both of these bodies receive a 
mandate from the entire nation and can speak on its 
behalf. Cases when the President does not have the 
support of the majority of MPs lead to confrontation 
between the two. In many countries, confl icts be-
tween these bodies often lead to irresolvable political 
dead ends, Constitutional coups, and even Civil Wars.
In addition, the relationship in the system of pow-
er division in our country is complicated by the 
presence of double-headed executive power and 
contradictions between the President and the 
Prime Minister, as both of them have the right 
to exercise executive power (state governance). 
To evaluate all existing variants of systems with pub-
licly-elected presidents, qualitative and quantitative re-
search has been carried out on the number and magni-
tude of Presidential authorities1.  This research demon-
strated that two types of systems with publicly-elected 
presidents are “safer”: 1) presidential systems – those 
in which the diff erent branches of power do not de-
  1Shugart M.S. and Carey J.M. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992.
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Political and Legal Analysis of the Changes in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic
pend on each other (i.e. the president cannot dissolve 
the Parliament, and the Parliament cannot dismiss 
the Executive power), but with weak presidential leg-
islative authorities, and 2) Prime-Presidential systems 
– those states where the branches of power depend 
on each other (the President is eligible for dissolving 
the Parliament, and the Parliament can express a vote 
of no-confi dence in the government), but at the same 
time the President cannot dismiss the government2. 
The names of the various systems of government or-
ganization do not refl ect who is stronger, as many 
mistakenly believe. For any type of a government, the 
most important issue is who can sack the Government 
members (the Ministers, including the Prime-Minister) 
from their positions. The government is responsible for 
overall governance of the country; it implements laws 
and accounts for the economy and safety of the citi-
zens. Economic reforms and overall well-being mainly 
depend on the work of the government. In a Parliamen-
tary system, the Parliament can dismiss the govern-
ment, and in a Presidential system, the President can.
 
Any system of government organiza-
tion should meet two main criteria:
I) The system should delegate the responsibil-
ity for state management to one of the two publicly 
elected bodies (either the President or the Parliament), 
i.e. for the decision of dismissing the Government.
II) Confl icts unavoidably emerging among vari-
ous branches of power should be resolved by refer-
ence to the procedures of the system, which is the 
key to its durability. Thus, the Constitution should 
provide rules and procedures for resolving confl icts.
Did the System of Power Organization Change in the 
New Constitution?
The main issue in any system is the issue of respon-
sibility for the work of the government. “The govern-
ment in its activity is responsible and accountable 
to the Jogorku Kenesh,” states the new constitution. 
However, this responsibility and accountability is lim-
ited to the annual report of the Prime Minister to the 
Jogorku Kenesh. Based on the results of the annual 
report of the Prime Minister, the Jogorku Kenesh can 
express no-confi dence in the Government by popular 
vote, true, but the President has a right to disagree with 
the decision of the Jogorku Kenesh. In the event that 
the Jogorku Kenesh will repeatedly make a decision of 
no-confi dence in the government, then the President 
can choose to announce either the dismissal of the 
government or the dissolution of the Jogorku Kenesh.
The name of the system of governance in the Kyrgyz-
stan remains the same as when it was fi rst introduced 
in 1993: “Presidential-Parliamentary.” This is a hybrid 
system, which means that in this system neither the 
President nor the Parliament is responsible for the work 
of the government. Both of them have authority to in-
fl uence the  dismissal of the government. The President 
dominates in this system, but neither of them is respon-
sible for their authority. Although the President makes 
the decision in the end, the majority of people think that 
the government is accountable to the Parliament as well.
Our neighbors, Russia and Kazakhstan, also have 
hybrid systems and similar rules on dismiss-
ing the government. However, there is a diff er-
ence between us and our more economically 
secure neighbors. They have the resources to:
• Satisfy the fi nancial requests of the 
political elite (they have what to divide)
• Sustain punitive bod-
ies and intimidate the opposition
• Feed the Mass Media and NGOs
• Provide the people with bread and circus
• Not depend on international donors that 
support an independent media, and NGOs and 
demand implementation of democratic reforms.
An economically backward country cannot aff ord such 
cumbersome, non-functional systems that are fore-
seen in our Constitution. This system is cumbersome 
because it simultaneously supports two non-working 
apparati – the President’s and Government’s. Moreover, 
it does not function, because neither the President 
nor Parliament takes responsibility for the work of 
the government. Based on the new Constitution, 
the President will continue to avoid taking respon-
sibility for the work of the government and blam-
ing the government or Parliament for all problems. 
Furthermore, the Parliament will to complain about 
the vast authority of the President. Most important-
ly, this system does not foresee any mechanism of 
resolving this confl ict between the President and 
the Parliament. If the majority of Deputies do not sup-
port the President, they will always confl ict with each 
other, and the government will always end up as a 
scapegoat. We already had a government of this kind.
If the system foresees a publicly elected President and 
also a position of a Prime-Minister – as in our country 
– it is recommended for the Parliament to handle the 
issue of dismissing the Government, as is practiced in 
France and Poland. The diff erence of these systems 
from ours is that the President must dismiss the 
government if the Parliament expresses a vote of 
no-confi dence. Besides, in both Poland and France, 
many of the authorities that our president has are 
given to the competence of the Prime Minister, includ-
ing counter-signing presidential acts and the right for 
legislative initiative (except for the President in France).
  2Definitions of the government types and differences between them. for more information see work: Iskakov G.T. Elections and 
Democracy in Kyrgyzstan: Constitutional design of President – Parliament relationship. – Bishkek, 2003.
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It  is  considered that the main achievement 
of the new Constitution is that the Parlia-
ment will be responsible for forming the Gov-
ernment. However, this is far from being true.
“The government is formed by the political party 
that gains more than 50% of the total number of 
Deputies elected by party-list,” states the Consti-
tution. This statement has two signifi cant fl aws.
First, this 50% out of the forty-fi ve seats allocated for 
party-list makes up 23 seats. Based on mathematical 
and psychological principles of party-list (PL) practices, 
no party will be able to gain this number of seats in 
the course of fair, just, and real elections. Only unfairly 
high election thresholds (from the point of view of all 
other 60-70 parties) and a signifi cant usage of adminis-
trative resource might provide this number of seats to 
one party. Most likely, this victor will be the party of the 
current power since it is in charge of almost all media 
and administrative resource in the country. To what will 
these elections lead? – Events similar to March 2005.
The second fl aw is that no other Constitution in the 
world states that a party forms the government. The 
government is legally formed by the Parliamentary 
majority, which is politically made up by the depu-
ties of parties. However, this last point is not stated 
in the constitution, because experiences and election 
results are much more diverse than the authors of 
the constitution can picture. One should not try to fi t 
into a narrow framework that which does not fi t there. 
The Constitution further states that if no party gains 
more than 50% of the number of Deputies of Jogorku 
Kenesh elected by party list, then the President fi rstly 
identifi es a party among winners in the Party-list elec-
tions. If that party then fails, the President may assign 
any party that participated in elections to form the 
government. In general, the President can grant this 
chance twice to diff erent parties on his consideration.
In the event that none of these three parties can 
form the government in the timeframe provided in 
the Constitution, then the President can dissolve 
Jogorku Kenesh and form the government himself. 
Therefore, in the best-case scenario, the will of twen-
ty-three Deputies will determine the government. 
In the worst case, the will of an unknown party or a 
so-called “party” with no seats in the Parliament will 
become obligatory for the remaining 67 Deputies! 
Meanwhile, we are talking about distribution of Min-
isterial Seats – power, infl uence and money – high 
stakes! How can the Deputies of Jogorku Kenesh that 
won on the nation-wide elections agree with the 
composition of the government off ered by a party 
that has no (or few) representatives in the Parliament, 
abandoning those people proposed by the party? 
The authors of this constitutional story might have 
thought that the President would be constructive and 
would try to reach an agreement with the Jogorku 
Kenesh. However, the past practices of cooperation 
by our Presidents with various compositions of the 
Jogorku Kenesh demonstrate that they are strongly 
mistaken. Besides, it is worth remembering the cases 
of leaders of advanced Western European democracies:
Gerhard Schroeder, former German Chancellor, had 
long resisted joining the Coalition to be led by Angela 
Merkel, whose party won over 50% of the seats in the 
Bundestag – the German Parliament! Probably many 
remember his furious face during negotiations, and 
the tears during his seeing-off  broadcasted on national 
television. Italian Prime-Minister Silvio Berlusconi also 
persistently and extensively disputed the results of the 
last parliamentary elections, and refused to free his seat.
With a signifi cant presence in the Parliament of 
Ukraine, the Party of Regions of Yanukovich faced fa-
mous challenges during the long-lasting and intense 
negotiations with other parties while forming the 
government. Witnessing challenges and threats over 
the Ukrainian Parliament, several Russian Media out-
lets gloated over the new Constitution of post-revo-
lutionary Ukraine. The party of Yulia Timoshenko was 
ready for the Parliament’s dissolution and new elec-
tions just to disagree with the proposals on the com-
position of the government made by Yanukovich.
These examples all involve pressure by party leaders 
that received a signifi cant majority of seats in the Par-
liament based on election results. With the election 
system that has been created in the Constitution of 
Kyrgyzstan, there will never be a party with a clear 
majority in the Kyrgyzstani Parliament (in the case 
of free and fair elections). In Russia, a similar mix of par-
ty-list – popular vote was used. Examining the results 
of several elections in Russian, we can anticipate that 
single-mandate districts will not lead to the enlarge-
ment and coalescence of parties in our country either, 
since the same parties will not win in the majority of 
single-mandate districts – there will be too many par-
ties. Neither will the forty-fi ve seats allocated for the 
party list help to create a parliamentary majority, since 
these seats will be divided between at least fi ve par-
ties at the election threshold of 5%. In other words, 
hardly any party will receive the agreement of the ma-
jority of MPs for their composition of the government.
When the third party proceeds to form the govern-
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Political and Legal Analysis of the Changes in the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic
ment and the Jogorku Kenesh faces the risk of dis-
solution, the designated party might be underrep-
resented in the Parliament, a hardly-known “pocket 
party” of the President. For example, the President can 
assign this task twice to parties incapable of forming 
a government so that on the third attempt, under the 
threat of dissolution, he can force newly elected Dep-
uties to form a government that is pleasing to him.
Since the President designates a party of his choice 
to recommend for his approval a candidate for Prime 
Minister within fourteen days of designation, and then 
to form a government and identify its structure not 
later than another fourteen days after the approval of 
a Prime Minister (a total of twenty-eight days), eighty-
four days might be required just to form the govern-
ment, as this process can be repeated up to three times! 
Most importantly, however, the President can dis-
miss the Prime Minister, any other Minister, or the 
entire Government independently and at any time. 
The nation will observer the torments of the Jogorku 
Kenesh while attempting to form a government that they 
choose for themselves. It will be torment and punish-
ment for the entire country. With this new Constitution, 
we acquired preprogrammed confl icts in the system 
of governance, and therefore in the country itself. 
The right to allocate the budget of the country usu-
ally belongs to the highest legislative body. Starting 
from 1998, our constitution has required changes to 
the laws regarding the budget and draft bills, fore-
seeing an increase of expenses or a decrease of bud-
get income can only be introduced to the Jogorku 
Kenesh and passed with the approval of the govern-
ment. This requirement was fully maintained in the 
Constitution of 2006, which means that the Jogorku 
Kenesh is not eligible to set, for example, tax benefi ts 
or pensions, allowance rates, etc, without the agree-
ment of the government. In other words, the bud-
get is in the competence of the executive branch.
To prevent an increase in budget expenses and to 
avoid Parliamentary unpredictability, Constitutions 
sometimes set some limitations on the budget au-
thorities of the Parliament. For example, the govern-
ment might set the upper boundary of overall ex-
penses within which the Parliament may introduce 
its changes, or the Parliament might be able to in-
crease expenses only if it identifi es new sources of 
income. But giving such extensive budget authori-
ties to the government, so that the Parliament can-
not plan or change the budget without its agreement, 
does not exist in any other system but Kyrgyzstan.
In the end, we should briefl y highlight weak legal style 
of the Constitution. The text lacks the correctness 
and integrity of commonly-used terminology, points 
of style, logic, and consistency. Such weaknesses are 
obvious even with a quick glance at the Constitution.
For example, the article devoted to procedures of form-
ing the government (the next article contains a con-
tinuation of these procedures) suddenly encloses two 
clauses about the dismissal of the Prime-Minister, the 
government, or its individual members, upon their pe-
tition, that is either accepted or declined by the Presi-
dent (Article 69). The text uses diff erent terms regarding 
the same notions. For example, in some places it reads, 
“a decision about dismissal” of the government, and 
in others, “a decision about a vote of no-confi dence.”
The Constitution should regulate the most impor-
tant issues of a single order (of a single importance or 
level of signifi cance). Our Constitution does address 
important constitutional-level issues, such as “The pro-
cedure of elections of the President are defi ned by the 
law.” Meanwhile, issues of much less signifi cance are 
also provided in the Constitution, such as “The num-
ber of candidates for the President’s offi  ce is limited. 
Candidates running for Presidency must be registered 
persons having collected at least fi fty thousand signa-
tures.” Such a practice was done on many issues. Regard-
ing the Deputies of the Jogorku Kenesh, for example, 
there are sanctions balancing the Deputy’s mandate 
with other jobs and entrepreneurship. Similar restric-
tions on the President were taken out with no reason.
The phrase that elections are to be conducted “based on 
universally equal and direct electoral rights with by se-
cret ballot) is repeated four times in the Constitution, in 
Articles 1 (about general elections), 43 (about presiden-
tial elections), 54 (about parliamentary elections), and 
90 (about local Kenesh elections) – as an incantation.
The phrase “of the Kyrgyz Republic” (inheritance from 
the Constitution of 2003) is encountered 585 times in the 
text. It takes up two pages of the text. How much time 
will this phrase take away from lawyers, students, and 
professors who attempt to read and interpret the Con-
stitution? As if someone reading or using the Constitu-
tion of the Kyrgyz Republic might think that it is talking 
about the President or Government of Kazakhstan or 
Russia, or the Jogorku Kenesh of another country. Con-
stitutions of other countries do not have this feature.
Transitional Clauses of the Constitution.
One of the articles states: “Legislative acts that are 
practiced until the Constitution comes into eff ect are 
to be practiced until their revocation or until they are 
brought to full alignment with the Constitution.” In oth-
er words, existing legislative acts are valid “until they 
are brought to full alignment with the Constitution.” 
Therefore, they have legal force even if they contra-
dict the Basic Law of the state. Such statements put all 
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law-enforcement agencies, including courts and other 
state bodies, in a completely ambiguous situation, 
which might lead to free interpretation and application 
of norms contradicting the Constitution. Moreover, 
such a situation will result in even bigger distrust of 
the courts on behalf of citizens, as well as further con-
fl icts between higher-level government institutions.
In this case, it should have stated, “Legislative acts 
that are practiced until the analogous parts of the 
new Constitution comes into eff ect are to be used in 
so much as they do not contradict the Constitution.” 
Revocation or modifi cation of acts is a natural way of 
systematizing legislation, and does not need a spe-
cial note in transitional clauses of the Constitution.
The transitional clauses further state that, “Laws and 
other legal acts should be brought in compliance with 
the current constitution not less than six months after 
it comes into eff ect.” Ideally, the systematization of le-
gal acts means the abolition of contradictions and gaps 
between them. However, the presence of contradic-
tions and gaps in the legislature does not mean that 
lawyers using these norms will refuse to work on legal 
issues or solve them in an illegal (or incorrect) manner, 
referring to the indicated natural fl aws in legislation.
This is already the fi fth change in the Constitution since 
its adoption in 1993. Russia for example, also adopted a 
Constitution at the same time, and has not changed it 
since then. Due to on-going and inconsistent changes 
to the Constitution, our poor country compensates the 
work of numerous legal services of the Government fo-
cusing on the so-called matching of current legislation 
with the Constitution. In our country, we do not follow 
laws. We write them, adopt and change them, and al-
ways speak about their imperfection, but we do not 
know how to apply them. From within forums on the 
highest level – national and international conferences – 
to the conversations of taxi drivers and meetings on the 
street, one can hear about need for improved legislation.
Frequent changes of major “rules of the game” initi-
ated by President Akaev formed infantile, relativist 
attitude towards all laws on the part of the Deputies 
of Parliament, the citizens and major politicians. Sym-
bolically speaking, the “game” cannot start or lead to 
specifi c results due to these on-going changes made 
to its “rules.” Frequent changes to the Constitution 
are accompanied by even more frequent, and most-
ly irresponsible, changes in the current legislation. 
Politicians understand that the purpose of their political 
activity is not accountability to the public for the results 
achieved by the government, i.e. during the “game,” but 
changes of the “rules of the game.” Everyone considers 
it normal to criticize and question the fundamental 
laws of the state, as well as to suggest changes and 
participate in adopting them. This circumstance results 
in a situation in which the line between expert judg-
ment/competence and political tricks, between writing 
laws and implementing them, is lost. The entire society, 
following its political leaders, has fallen into a chasm 
of irresponsibility and attitude towards everything, in-
cluding state management, their responsibilities, and 
laws – as to temporary and transitory phenomena. 
Such an attitude to laws has resulted in a general defor-
mation of legal consciousness, under which even law-
yers not only practice criticality, but also teach future 
generations to criticize the approved state norms rather 
than to apply the law. The best case would be to identify 
problems and contradictions in legislation and recom-
mend new rules, instead of resolving petty life confl icts 
within the legal framework. Naturally, law-enforcement 
agencies and courts could not avoid the universal “in-
toxication” by imitation of activity and responsibility. 
For now however, with the new Constitution we re-
acquired the old system with an irresponsible Par-
liament, an irresponsible President, and rules that 
generate confl icts between the President and 
Jogorku Kenesh. We will not only have to match the 
current legislation with the constitution, but will 
have to continue changing the Basic Law further.
P.S. The Constitution, according to the transitional clauses, 
is valid starting from the day the President signed it, that 
is, 9 November 2006. However, the text of the Constitution 
has not been offi  cially published yet, although discussions 
have been going on for one and a half years, and the Pres-
ident had already prepared three drafts (the October 2005 
versions of Beknazarov’s working group and the President’s 
own version submitted to Parliament on 30 October 2006). 
This analysis was based on the text of the Constitution that 
appeared on the websites: www.gov.kg, www.akipress.kg 
and www.24.kg (news agencies). At the time this article 
was fi nished, I received a scanned version of the Consti-
tution’s text with signatures. According to that draft, the 
President (and not the Parliament) approves Ministers, 
while the Parliament approves only the structure of the 
government. If that is true, at least two things are not clear: 
First, if President approves the government, for what 
reason can then President dissolve the Parliament? 
Second, what has been improved then, if the mecha-
nism of dismissing the Government remains the same 
– the President solely decides everything – and the 
mechanism of forming the government is not the 
same as demanded by the main opposition leaders? 
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Roundtable transcript 
THE NEW CONSTITUTION: POLITICS OR LAW?
Muratbek Imanaliev: I am happy to see that you 
found time to participate in our round table to discuss 
issues related to the adoption of the new constitution. 
The theme of our meeting is “The New Constitution: 
Politics or Law.” In my opinion, this process is still far 
from completed, and what will prevail in the end, as it 
is said, only time will tell. Obviously, the political arena 
is still not free from vestiges of the past; discussions 
are ongoing – not only about the constitution and not 
necessarily about political issues. Today, the opposition 
is already demanding the dismissal of the government. 
Both parties are continuously speaking on TV.
I think that there are two signifi cant aspects of the way 
the new constitution was adopted. One is the political 
component. The events taking place on the square forced 
both parties to reach a compromise, and a compromise 
means only semi-satisfaction of hopes and demands. The 
constitution has been passed in such a short amount of 
time (and that is not only the opinion of local experts, but 
also of those in the West and in the East) that observers 
did not even have time to track who was responsible 
for what legislation. The second aspect is that of the 
constitution as a legislative act. Today, together with 
experts from our country, I would like to discuss what we 
passed. Many of you have already indicated in the Media 
and on the Internet that the foundational document 
of the state is full of fl aws, which might result in a new 
coil of confrontation in the political and legal sphere.
I would like to know the opinion of our guest who 
works in the apparatus of the Supreme Court. 
How did it all happen and what did we pass? 
Aida Salyanova: It is diffi  cult for me to comment on 
the situation which occurred. Currently, we have a 
specifi c question: law or politics? Certainly, with great 
disappointment, I can state that politics took over in this 
situation. Although we claim to have a state governed 
by rule of law – that law should prevail over power, 
while power should follow the law – the events that 
took place clearly demonstrated that exactly politics is 
a higher priority than rule of law. The haste and pressure 
of the process through which the constitution was 
passed is yet another proof of this circumstance. We got 
what we got. I agree that there are many contradictory 
aspects that are not in concurrence with it each other, 
for example, the authorities of the Jogorku Kenesh [or 
JK; the parliament] listed in the article 58 and authorities 
of the president listed in the article 46. Contradictions 
exist even within one article, let alone inter-article 
contradictions. In any case, (and many are already 
speaking about it) the introduction of further changes 
to the constitution is inevitable. Simple adjustment of 
laws will not be suffi  cient, because many institutional 
aspects are already built into the constitution.
Gulnara Iskakova: We have found ourselves in such a 
ridiculous situation that it is not even comfortable to 
speak about it. We are citizens of this country; we are 
experts in this sphere. We did our best to participate 
in the discussion process: some of us designed drafts; 
others participated in parliamentary hearings with 
the conclusions of experts. Finally, we ended up with 
a constitution without special explanations, although 
they say it is based on the draft produced by the 
fi rst constitutional Council. Some things were done 
in a complete hurry; some new norms appeared…
Today, it turns out that formation of the government 
and the work of the highest levels of government, in 
compliance with the new constitution, might lead to 
a continuation of past confl icts. We are changing the 
constitution for the fi fth time since our independence! 
In Russia, the constitution was adopted in 1993, 
contemporarily with us, but they have not touched 
or changed it since then. Here it is going through 
changes for the fi fth time. Just as we were going to 
fi nish it last time, the best experts, including experts 
from the Jogorku Kenesh, cannot help but say that it 
needs to be changed again. What do we look like in the 
Date: November 15, 2006 
Location: Institute for Public Policy 
Moderator: Muratbek Imanaliev, president of the Institute for Public Policy 
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world’s eyes? It is a pity that we, citizens of this country, 
experts in this sphere, receive such a constitution.
Nurlan Sydykov: I already commented yesterday that 
even the formation of the personnel of the government 
engages three subjects based on the constitution: 
Jogorku Kenesh, the Prime Minister, and political 
parties – even here we have contradictions. Do you 
remember the question of depoliticizing the system 
of staff  appointment of the judges of local courts? The 
president appoints local judges upon the nomination 
of the National Council on Justice Issues, but at the 
same time, we see that function of the JK to approve 
the judges of local courts still remains in the new 
constitution. There are many of such contradictions. 
However, the fact of the matter is that we still have not 
seen the offi  cial version; amendments have not been 
published anywhere. Our expert community should 
be very cautious in commenting on the changes. We 
received what we have in a rush, and maybe the role 
of the expert community is very important here. All 
of us have a clear understanding of what happened, 
but we should not criticize it groundlessly, because 
stability in society depends on us as well. Our attitude 
can infl uence the situation in the republic because 
we can unintentionally support reactionary forces.
Suerkul Kosakov: We don’t know yet whether the 
constitution was adopted legally or not – this is the most 
important question. Yes, it was signed and it states that 
the document comes into eff ect as soon as it has been 
signed. According to the current constitution, however, 
article 96 about the introduction of changes and 
amendments still remains – foreseen and unchanged. No 
one has changed it or intends to change it. I spoke about 
this on TV yesterday and said, “to avoid the possibility 
of the document being called anti-constitutional or 
depicted as a document passed against the constitution, 
this issue should be resolved within three to six months.”
From a political point of view, I think that the constitution 
has been passed. From the legal aspect, however, the 
fi nal word is yet to be said, and no one has the right 
to ignore the legal aspect of formalizing the adoption 
of the constitution. That is the main contradiction; or 
as experts say, if we want to live with this constitution, 
the contradictions should be eliminated. As the 
Constitutional Court fi nishes reading it, it should be 
ratifi ed once again upon discussion. Otherwise, it 
is up in the air raising questions. It is good that we 
reached a compromise; maybe someone has lost some 
authority and the authorities of other have increased; 
whether we agree with some changes or not, the 
issue about the adoption of the constitution remains. 
I am not even mentioning the non-observance of 
some rules of legislative technique: e.g. one style, etc.
It seems that fi nally, for the fi rst time in fi fteen years, 
the Constitutional Court should say its word. Member 
of the Constitutional Court, the Chair in particular, 
should not have been present at the Constituent 
Assembly that night. I do not want to criticize these 
individuals, because it is a collegial body and decisions 
are made collegially, but I simply want to state that it 
is time for the Constitutional Court to say its word – to 
say at least “Let’s pass the constitution in compliance 
with the constitution.” As I said on TV, it is good that a 
referendum was not organized. Otherwise, we would 
have violated the constitution. Passing a constitution 
by two political parties may be constitutionally correct, 
based on the article 96 of the current constitution.
Galina Mukambaeva: So has the 
constitution been signed or not? 
Gulnara Iskakova: Usually, laws allocate space for 
signatures; I believe that this procedure should be 
observed and a new edition should be sent to the 
president. Possibly, signatures indicate support 
for the idea, i.e. it was initiated by members of the 
commission and there are signatures of all the borders.
Galina Mukambaeva: Having read the text of the bill 
about the new version and having looked through 
the transitional provision, I did not see the words “new 
edition.” The provision from 2003 stated everywhere 
“new edition of 2003.” We do not have the words “new 
edition” anywhere, although the law is called the “Law 
about the New Edition.” The signatures are missing in the 
allocated places. What happened in the end? Was the law 
signed and brought into eff ect, or was it just a theatrical 
gesture? Was the legal form of signing the law observed?
There are two scenarios. The fi rst: if legal aspects were not 
observed and the law did not come into eff ect, then there 
is a vacuum for some further actions or events. The second 
scenario: if the law is legally recognized in its new edition, 
then offi  cial statements about it should be published in 
the mass media so that society would not have doubts. 
Currently, nobody can answer this question. Thus, we 
should ask it once again and resolve it once and for all.
 
Since we have gathered at this round table, I would like to 
state the following: when we, experts, spoke, television 
did not always broadcast it. Therefore, the public was 
unaware of the things we discussed; it did not matter to 
anyone. Our conclusions did not have any meaning, as 
other hot political processes with the participation of the 
president were occurring at the same time. We did not 
count on the attention too much either, but we hear and 
know each other and understand each other’s positions 
of. We also know the positions of the civic sector, state 
structures, and the opposition. I think that we have the 
most convenient parliament in the world, because it is 
not diffi  cult to “win the favors” of thirty-eight voices in 
favor of some decision. My most favorite draft was that 
of Mr. Kulov, which foresaw a parliamentary form of 
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government. However, I doubt that in the current social 
and political situation, the parliament can raise its head 
and solve its own problems. We need 3-5 years to switch 
to Kulov’s draft. Without a party majority, the parliament 
cannot form a government and, as expected, we 
cannot shift to the parliamentary type of government. 
Still, all those demonstrations have the support of 
people, and tension grew so much that the impossible 
is becoming possible. Today, based on the new 
edition, we have a parliamentary style of government. 
Theoretically, the parliament can form government. 
From this point of view, maybe it is indeed a victory.
However, as was repeatedly stated, there are many 
inconsistencies. Perhaps, at a quick glance, they do not 
seem to be of a radical nature, but the matter comes down 
to the authorities of all three branches of power. As a 
result, the Government wins, because it is formed by the 
parliament, is not responsible in front of the president, 
and manages the internal aff airs of the state. Executive 
power is formed by a publicly elected body. Technically, 
the state could make it without the parliament. Therefore, 
if the level of political literacy of the people, the level 
of public observance of laws was so high that experts 
and specialists were assigned to draft legislative bills, 
the parliament would not be needed. We should not be 
afraid that the president will usurp power. Nowhere in the 
world is there a situation where the president does not 
usurp power, and where the parliament does not work on 
its personal issues and lobbies – it simply does not exist.
Tamerlan Ibraimov: Indeed, the procedures established 
for the adoption of the constitution were not followed, 
and it is early to say that we received a new constitution. 
Not one of us dealing with this issue has seen a signed 
and published version of the constitution. There is a 
concern that the fi nal version will be amended and 
changed. The legitimate question of the system of 
check-and-balances was raised. We had a constitution 
where the president was very powerful, and at the 
same time was not responsible for the activities of the 
government, because both the parliament and the 
president participated in the process of forming the 
government. In the new constitution, there is a norm 
that the government reports to the parliament. A more 
detailed analysis of the norms describing the process of 
forming the government and its responsibilities gives 
the impression that this norm is purely declarative.
What do we have such a great diff erence between de 
jure and de facto? We have the following mechanism: 
the parliament, consisting of ninety deputies, made up 
by 50% single-mandate districts and 50% party-lists. The 
right for forming the government is given to the party that 
won 50% plus one of the seats (the constitution states 
“a party,” which surprised me, because in countries with 
a parliamentary form of government, the constitution 
always states either “the parliamentary majority” or 
“the coalition majority.” The word “party” is not used, 
as it is some type of a political term, and is not used in 
the legal sphere. In other words, the use of this term is 
something new, invented by our lawmakers, possible by 
the president). In fact, twenty-three deputies will receive 
the opportunity to form the government. The rest of the 
sixty-seven deputies will sit and watch, because nothing 
depends on their opinion. Thus, the parliamentary 
minority gets a right to form the government. They 
receive the right to recommend candidates for the 
position of the Prime Minister for approval, and that 
is in the best case. Then, if the winning party fails to 
form the government and approve a Prime Minister, 
the president gives this right to another winning party. 
Again, what does the phrase “party that has won the 
elections” mean? Is it a party that has won one seat and 
was placed fi rst, second or third? It is not clear what this 
term assumes. Theoretically, a party with one seat in the 
parliament could receive an opportunity to nominate 
a Prime Minister, and that is still not the worst case yet.
The third stage goes as such: even if this party could not 
form the government, the president has the opportunity 
to select any party that participated in elections, which 
in my opinion is nonsense, as this party does not have 
to win any seats in the parliament, but based only on its 
participation in the elections is theoretically allowed it 
to propose candidates for the position of Prime Minister.
Finally, the fourth stage: even if this party fails to form 
a government, then the president himself forms the 
government and dissolves the parliament. What this 
means is that we have a situation when, in the best case, 
the parliamentary minority rules this issue and appoints 
their Prime Minister. Naturally, the parliament will hardly 
agree with such a mechanism. The parliament has the 
choice of self-dissolution. They must either dissolve 
themselves if they disagree with the position of the 
minority, or tolerate it. Here, it seems to me, a serious 
confl ict is built into the work of the parliament. We expected 
the new constitution to introduce some mechanisms 
of confl ict resolution, but here we see a time-bomb.
Zainidin Kurmanov: If we are only discussing whether 
any progress was made, then we are undoubtedly 
moving forward. Have we ever lived observing the 
law? We have never lived following the law. It is a new 
concept for us; in the current situation, we are not living 
according to the law either. We live guided by politicians 
and emotions. The constitution refl ects the emotional 
level of our legislators and politicians, including the 
president. We are not to blame for this chaos at all, 
because offi  cials are elected to avoid chaos. Since the 
authorities allowed such chaos, then they have to 
fi nd an applicable method of resolving the situation.
What type of politics is practiced nowadays? It is the 
same as was typical for Akaev, policy calling back to 
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authoritarianism, a clan system, tribalism, feudalism 
– that is the policy demonstrated by the power now. 
Priorities and trends towards these interested have 
remained, perhaps with the addition of two or three 
new slogans about economic growth. The policy 
has not changed signifi cantly, and people in power 
fairly rarely and with great eff ort utter the words 
“democracy,” “political reforms,” or “democratic reforms,” 
which create certain moods among the society.
Therefore, speaking about politics, due to which 
movement has occurred in our society, then the trend has 
moved towards liberal policy, despite all defi ciencies of 
the current constitution, which never happened before. 
If we argue that we had a democratic policy, which was 
turned into quasi-democracy, and that the concept of 
“democracy” has acquired a new meaning, then all the 
contradictions that you mentioned demonstrate that the 
society has heeled towards liberal values. Democratic 
policy means democratic procedures in the fi rst place, 
and with democratic procedures it is possible to save 
and retain any level of power. Hitler came to power via 
democratic procedures, and Akaev maintained power 
with them as well. The current governors of Central Asia 
continue to retain power using democratic procedures and 
mechanisms. Liberal policy is nevertheless a consensus 
reached between elites, between the government 
and the opposition, between the people and the 
government, because of certain values which, fi rst of all, 
include protection of the rights and interests of citizens, 
protection from tyranny, despots, their caprices, etc. 
The existence of the defi ciencies mentioned here 
indicates that the mechanism of coordinating interests 
are enhancing. Tamerlan is right: deputies should tolerate 
this arbitrariness; they should agree and fi nd mutually-
acceptable solutions, or they should break this system, 
express open protest, throw off  the conformism, and 
come out into a direct confl ict with the president. If we 
had true liberals and social-democrats in our country, then 
this constitution would indeed have set a time-bomb on 
future confl icts. However, since our communists resemble 
liberals more than liberals resemble communists, then it 
is possible to say that this constitution is capable in terms 
of conformism, conciliation and mitigating confl ict.
There will be certain confl icts between various groups, 
but they will be forced to sit together at the table of 
negotiations and seek mutually-acceptable solutions. 
I am not saying that principles should be traded. There 
are people who won’t trade principles. In general, 
however, the situation might lead to that stability about 
which our society dreams. Our leaders cannot fi nd this 
stability because they are not aware of many things. 
Thus, the procedures and mechanisms of coordination 
have not been working here. Politicians should be 
capable of reaching consensus; the format of round and 
square tables should be perfected. If these procedures 
and formats would have been polished, then the confl ict 
between the power and opposition in November, 
would have resulted, just as in normal states, in a joint 
memorandum, where confronting parties state and 
express their intentions regarding the authorities of the 
parliament, president, government, etc., whereupon 
experts would take on the task of clearly and competently 
drafting a constitution corresponding to the content 
of the agreement and content of the memorandum. 
If that had happened, we would not have ended up 
in such a stalemate situation as we have currently. 
What happened also demonstrates that our political 
elite are hopelessly behind modern demands. In terms 
of political and economic values and the modernization 
of civil society, contemporary international trends 
turned out to be much more advanced than our 
political elite could grasp, and they have been forced 
to drag behind global political processes and events. 
It is disappointing that our political leaders are not 
suggesting new processes of political modernization, 
and rather want to preserve the existing regime or 
go for further reduction of the recent liberalization.
Muratbek Imanaliev: Who is in charge now? 
Gulnara Iskakova: The name of the governmental 
type does not answer the question of who is in 
charge. The type of government indicates which 
one of the two publicly elected bodies bares 
responsibility for the activity of the government.
Zainidin Kurmanov: The head is the president; based 
on article 42 of the KR constitution, “…the head of state 
is the highest offi  cial in the country.” The government 
is part of the state, and he is the head of state.
Muratbek Imanaliev: There is a diff erence. If the 
president is the head of state and head of the executive 
power at the same time, then it is one political and 
legal circumstance. If not, then it is entirely diff erent. 
The U.S., for example, does not have a head of state.
Galina Mukambaeva: I agree that many politicians are 
behind. Theories of the division of power are already 
the past; at some point the theory of three branches of 
government was the classic. Based on our constitution, 
the president is ahead of the other branches of power. 
Many scientists pay close attention to the fact of who is 
fi rst in the constitution on the basis of the enumeration 
of powers to the branches of government. The president 
still has a place in the constitution, but lacks it in the 
power division theory. No one has spoken about this until 
now. I want to say that the president is an independent 
branch of governmental power. When we draw 
diagrams for students, I also put the president on top 
of the legislative branch, controlling, electing, fi nancial 
branches of power. Already six to seven branches of 
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power have been added with time. The complication of 
the functioning of state apparati led to this development, 
and we are still talking about three branches of power.
 Secondly, according to the constitution of the U.S., for 
example, the president represents executive power, 
and he is indeed the head of state. In our republic, 
the president is head of a separate branch of power 
that does not relate to the executive branch of power. 
The constitution has a concept of “authorities,” but 
in theory there is a concept of the “functions” of the 
branches of power, which fl ow into the authorities 
secured in the constitution. He has those functions.
Two opinions exist in this regard. The fi rst is that the 
president is an independent branch of power, and 
has his own apparatus. The other opinion is that the 
executive branch should be structured, and that 
presidential power and the government should be 
separated into the highest executive body. Let it be so, 
but neither the old constitution nor the law about the 
new edition state that executive power is given to the 
president, that he is the head of the government as 
well. Is this good or bad? I think it is good for a society 
that lives in peace. However, in places where leaders 
are busy delegating occupations, it is bad when a 
person concentrates so much power in his hands.
We experienced a family clan, where one person resolved 
all issues of staff  policy in the state. Therefore, to avoid this 
situation, we opted for the Prime Minister to take on the 
executive power and head it. It turns out that, based on the 
old and new constitutions, presidential power is separate 
from the executive branch of power. Does this mean that 
we have become a parliamentary state? Until the end of 
this term, everything has remained the same: the same 
president and government, as well as the parliament.
Close adherence to classical theory shows that the 
presidential-parliamentary form of government does 
not exist. This term was invented to please the president. 
The constitution of Kazakhstan, for example, openly 
states that the Republic of Kazakhstan is presidential 
– and they are not afraid to recognize it. Here, probably, 
the president is afraid that people will not be happy 
with the scope of his authorities, as he indeed has many 
authorities, which one can see in the constitution as 
well. Therefore, our form was called a “hybrid,” as if the 
president coexists with the parliament. However, we 
had a presidential form of government, and still have it.
Regarding parties… If none of the parties receives 
50% of the seats reserved for party-lists, then the 
president “identifi es a political party from the total 
number of winners.” One legitimate question regards 
how he will identify a party. Does he select the party 
as he wants? Indeed, it might happen that a minority 
will rule over the majority. If opposition deputies 
think that they won, then I want to state that they 
won only mentally, not in the legal fi eld, because 
nothing has changed. One can draw the conclusion 
that staff  policy will be defi ned by the president. The 
constitutional initiative still belongs to the president.
You have initiated this roundtable, and I suggest 
to expand it and to invite deputies, because we 
cannot answer all the questions raised here. Then, 
possibly, we will identify what the form of the 
government we have is. Let them explain what their 
victory is, if everything is still the same. Thank you. 
Gulnara Iskakova: Why does the type of government 
matter for us? The concept of the type of government 
is in the complete list of certain characteristics of a 
consistently functioning system. Government type is 
identifi ed by the body dismissing the government. Who 
has the right to do this based on the new constitution? 
Yes, the parliament can express a vote of no confi dence, 
but the president can disagree. If, in three months, 
the parliament expresses a vote of no confi dence 
again, then the president can choose to dismiss the 
government or dissolve the parliament. Besides, it does 
not matter what eff orts the parliament puts into forming 
the government, because at any point the president can 
dismiss the whole government upon his own initiative, 
either the Prime Minister or individual ministers, which 
means that the government still reports to the president.
Muratbek Imanaliev: However, a lot has been 
said about the government, that the Prime 
Minister has become more independent. 
Gulnara Iskakova: In general, the government exists 
separately from the president in hybrid types of 
government or in a parliamentary form of government. In 
presidential forms of government, the government does 
not exist separately. Rather it is the full responsibility of 
the president, and it is not called the government but 
the presidential Administration. We have a hybrid form, 
presidential-parliamentary. This concept was introduced 
by two Harvard professors, Shugart and Carey, in their 
book presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design 
and Electoral Dynamics, published in 1992. They 
researched systems where the president was publicly 
elected, analyzed the authorities of the president, and 
came up with the presidential-parliamentary form of 
government. The authors intended to indicate that the 
system does not make it clear who, the president or the 
parliament, is responsible for the work of the government.
This constitution confuses people. We, experts see 
that all authorities are concentrated in hands of the 
president in the end, but it might not be clear for 
people, especially since Members of parliament have 
been claiming that they won and have more authority 
now. In fact, the main authorities have remained with 
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the president, and the system has not changed. What 
did they fi ght for, and why did the president resist? The 
authority of approving the structure of government 
is missing in the list of presidential authorities, but it 
is mentioned in other norms and chapters. The same 
is true about the approval of the chair and deputies 
of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts. These 
authorities simply moved from article 46 to the chapter 
on judicial power. The authorities have decreased visibly, 
but in fact, they were just moved to other chapters. It 
resembles Caesar’s principle of “divide and conquer.” 
The parliament will not have a majority, because only 
half of it will be elected on party-lists, and a majority 
there can be reached only with a high election threshold, 
which will be unfair towards parties that cannot 
claim that they enjoy the recognition and/or respect 
of the entire nation. A high election threshold also 
guarantees that those controlling the mass media will 
win elections, and who controls the mass media here?
Even at a 5% election threshold, none of the parties will 
gain a majority of those seats reserved for party-lists. 
There will be at least, four to fi ve parties. For a party to win 
a majority of seats on the party-list system, the threshold 
should not be less than 7%. Then, however, it would be an 
unfair system or produce unfair elections. The constitution 
provides for what is impossible to implement in reality.
In the case of failed attempts to form the government, the 
parliament faces the risk of dissolution, and the deputies 
will decide whether to annul all of their activity and go 
for dissolution, to go through elections again and end 
up with the same result, or to go under the president and 
agree with the recommendations of a party that does 
not have a majority of seats, possibly only a few seats 
in the parliament. If, in the end, the president does not 
like the result, he can dismiss the whole government.
Muratbek Imanaliev: What place does 
the government take in this hierarchy?
 
Aida Salyanova: Out of the three branches of power, 
the executive branch wins in comparison with the other 
two, and the president wins in at least several factors. 
First, the Prime Minister will form the government 
independently. That stipulation did not exist before, 
and it is even a positive norm. Second, if in the past the 
president could independently form executive bodies; 
now he does not have this right. This development 
means that any bodies of executive power will be formed 
only with the participation and acknowledgement of 
the Prime Minister. The issue of the National Security 
Service has been discussed. Now it is under the structure 
of the government. A series of such authorities indicate 
the enhancement of the government’s position.
The constitution provides the norm that at least 50% of 
the parliament will be elected by party-list. Therefore, the 
code can regulate it: maybe it will be 75%, maybe 90%. 
Usually, legislation can adjust the ratio. The term “at least” 
was put in the norm to promote party development. 
Articles 69 and 70, allocated for the government, also 
indicate the democratic capacity of the new constitution. 
They speak about the role of parties in general. These 
articles raise especially hot debates among experts. My 
colleagues have also touched upon them, but there is 
one more important aspect regarding dissolution: Let us 
suppose that party representatives (possibly only three 
of them) cannot form a government or appoint the Prime 
Minister. Then, the whole parliament will be responsible 
for accomplishing it. This is indeed nonsense, because at 
the end of the norm it is stated that the president can 
dismiss the parliament. Therefore, in the event of the 
decision of a minority or the failure of the minority to 
fulfi ll their mission by the set deadline, the responsibility 
falls on the parliament overall, which will be dissolved. 
Clearly there are norms that require revisions. 
Suerkul Kosakov: Nothing that we are discussing today 
will be revised or resolved unless we agree on principles. 
Ideally, the division of power and system of check-and-
balances is related to the fact that it restrains one of the 
branches of power against the other two (or, in contrast, 
two against one) to control, etcetera. What does the 
government represent? It is a system of governmental 
bodies that were given main functions, i.e. types of activity. 
These main functions include legislative, executive, and 
judicial control. As for the president, he has all these 
functions. How does one correlate the implementation 
of these functions? Therefore, in order for a branch of 
power to stay within its scope of functions, the other two 
should control it. When this balance is broken, one starts 
prevailing over the others. This principle should guide 
us while distributing authorities. From the point of view 
of classical democratic theory, the work of politicians 
should be directed exactly at this point. Otherwise, 
it is impossible to create a democratic society. A close 
look at the U.S. constitution and an analysis of how 
the power is practiced demonstrates that, although 
the concept of “power division” is not mentioned 
anywhere, it is observed. The theory of the division 
of power appeared in 1787, and it is still developing.
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Recommendations of the IPP for the Structure of the Government and 
Apparatus of the Prime Minister
I. Governing Body (Leadership) 
1. Prime-minister (general leadership)
2. First vice prime-minister (executive management 
over the economy) 
3. Vice prime-minister (programming social-
economic development) 
II. Services and Committees under the Prime-
Minister 
1. Revenue and Intelligence Services 
2. Migration Service
3. Financial Inspectorate and Accounting Service
4. Committee on fi ghting against corruption 
5. Committee on developing local self-government
III. Central Ministries 
1. Ministry of Finance
2. Ministry of Foreign Aff airs
3. Ministry of Defense
4. Ministry of Culture and Public Relations
5. Ministry of National Security
6. Ministry of Justice
 
IV. Sectoral Ministries
1. Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
2. Ministry of Transport and Communications
3. Ministry of Industry and Trade
4. Ministry of Agriculture and Commodity Production 
5. Ministry of Education and Science 
6. Ministry of Health and Physical Culture
7. Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare
8. Ministry of Interior Aff airs
9. Ministry of Emergency Situations and Nature 
Protection Systems
V. State Agencies
1. Agency on Development of Tourism
2. Agency on Managing State Property 
3. Agency on Architecture and Construction 
4. Agency on State Purchases and Material Reserves 
5. Agency on Geology and Mineral Resources 
6. Agency on Intellectual Property 
7. Agency on Archives
8. Agency on Drug Control
9. Agency on Statistics 
10. Agency on Anti-Monopoly Policy
VI. Commissions (Public-State) 
1. Commission on Migration and Employment
2. Commission on State Language
3. Commission on Appointment-Making Policy
4. Commission on Youth Policy
5. Commission on Corruption Prevention 
VII. Academies and Institutes 
1. Academy of Management 
2. National Institute on Standardization and Metrology 
Note:
1) The authority to register property rights should 
be given  to the Ministry of Justice
2) Religious issues should be the prerogative of 
the Ministry of Culture and Public Relations.
Structure of the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
The structure of the Government is a very important issue not only from an 
organizational aspect, but also from the political one. Therefore, forming the structure 
of the Government must be addressed with great thoroughness and responsibility. 
The Institute for Public Policy proposes its own version of the structure of Government. On the one 
hand, it represents the experience and knowledge of the Institute’s leadership, who have work 
for the Government in the past. On the other hand, it represents our vision and attempt to re-
reform the Government in such a way as would objectively meet the current needs of our country. 
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Apparatus of the Prime-minister of the Kyrgyz Republic
Department on 
programming social-
economic development
Department on 
innovation of and 
investment in programs 
and projects
Department on 
supporting the 
development of 
national business
Department on 
regulating the execution 
of government decrees
Chancellery  Financial and 
economic management 
Legal section Protocol service (2 
people) 
Group of assistants 
(3 people)
Group of advisors on public relations, relations 
with the Parliament and relations with legal bodies 
(5 people) 
Security 
Ministries 
 
The structure of the Government is divided into 
several categories of institutions and departments. 
First of all, it includes central and sectoral ministries. 
Why is there a necessity for such a division? 
From our point of view, central ministries are the agencies 
of public administration, which form certain areas 
(fi elds). Thus, the responsibility of Ministry of Finance 
includes not only fi nancing and budgeting issues, but 
also the formation of economic and fi nancial arenas 
on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Such sorts of issues are 
also included in the responsibilities of the Ministries of 
Defense and National Security; in other words, the issue is 
about creating an area of security  and, above all, political 
stability within the country, as well as creating friendly 
surroundings outside the territory of Kyrgyzstan. This 
point is also relevant to the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs. 
The Ministry of Culture and Public Relations is also one of 
the central ministries. One of the important issues that lie 
before the people and authority structures of Kyrgyzstan 
is not only the formation of a culture based on our 
wonderful traditions and heritage, but also the formation 
of new culture. Extremely important in this respect is the 
issue of forming new patterns of behavior, new economic 
and physical cultures, along with many other cultures in 
developing our country. The basis of everything that a 
country and its people can do is culture. The Ministry 
of Culture is to some degree an ideological ministry, 
which must consider the issues mentioned above. 
As the title indicates, sectoral ministries work on 
certain sectors. However, the division into central 
and sectoral ministries does not mean that the 
central ministries are the dominating or leading ones. 
The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources must be 
specifi cally highlighted. Why is there a need to create 
such specialized ministry today? First of all, energy is 
one of the foundations of any country today. If there 
is no energy, then there is no economy! Currently, 
energy is one of the most important issues in the 
world economy:  all countries, without exception, both 
developed and developing, are extremely concerned 
with the issues of energy supply and energy autonomy. 
Secondly, the main problem of energy in the country 
is related to its management and development.
The development of the water industry or aqua industry 
is of current importance to Kyrgyzstan. For this reason, 
the department is called the Ministry of Energy and 
Water resources. Why is there an issue about water? We 
at the IPP believe that water will be the basis of economic 
development, including the energy of our country. Water 
is not just a resource, which could be used for agricultural 
purposes, industrial purposes, and others. In addition 
though, water also concerns issues of health care, 
security, and new, innovative technologies connected 
with water usage. Most importantly however, water is 
energy. Therefore, we must include the development 
of the aqua industry or water industry not only in the 
management system, but also as a scientifi c basis.  We 
think it would be a great idea to establish a Water Academy. 
Besides scientifi c basis, of course, there must be an 
educational basis, a technological basis, and many other 
components that are important for the development of 
the water industry in our country. Today many experts 
forecast a rise in prices for water and its defi cit in the 
Commentary 
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future; thus, it is time to address this issue seriously. 
Health care and physical culture are interrelated very 
closely, and could be united under one ministry. We 
need to learn not only how to keep our health, but 
also how to strengthen it through physical culture. 
The population of our country must be actively 
involved in strengthening its physical culture. 
State Agencies and Commissions 
The next group is state agencies. Agencies must 
function, despite their diff erences from the structures 
that existed before. Possibly, it is necessary to consider 
the issue of which agencies would be structural 
subunits of either central or sectoral ministries. This 
issue must receive careful research and decision making. 
State commissions are extremely important. They must 
be state-public, or government-public. First of all, it 
would ensure transparency and openness in discussion 
of those questions which are the most relevant to 
our country, including such issues as migration, 
state language, youth policy, and the prevention of 
corruption. Secondly, public commissions ensure the 
involvement of civil society institutes in the processes 
of management and decision-making at the state level. 
The commission on appointment-making policy has a 
special purpose. Recruitment, training, and allocation of 
specialists have a great role. The slogan “cadres decide 
everything” had a meaning not only in the Soviet 
Union, but also in many other countries, including 
Japan. Human resources are the main resources 
which guarantee the development of any country. 
The Structure of the Apparatus of the Prime Minister 
We need to avoid creating sectoral departments and 
subunits within the structure of the apparatus of the 
Prime Minister which will be separately responsible 
for agriculture, social issues, industry, and others. The 
apparatus of prime minister must deal with global 
issues; it must not be just an apparatus which controls 
and manages ministries, but must also represent an 
independent body which develops serious programs 
for the socio-economic development of our country: 
forming, adapting, and implementing investment and 
innovation programs/projects. Another important task 
is the support and promotion of national business. It is 
absolutely clear that under the current situation, it will 
be diffi  cult to ensure the economic development of the 
country as a whole without developing national business. 
On the other hand, such a structure of apparatus 
makes it possible to strengthen the independence of 
the ministries and increase the quality of their work. 
Possibly, donors and international fi nancial institutes 
might disagree with the idea of creating a department 
on programming social-economic development. 
However, we must always remember: planning and 
programming of not only the development of the entire 
country, but also that of certain institutes is an important 
condition which guarantees qualitative development of 
concrete objectives, as well as the country as a whole.
Bazarbay Mambetov:
“Control over water resources is a key element of future power 
of Kyrgyzstan”
Due to the latest hot discussions about the price for Uzbek gas and hydro electricity supply to Uzbekistan, the Bishkek Press 
Club interviewed Bazarbai Mambetov, international expert on power energy, president of the Association of Oil Traders 
of Kyrgyzstan.
Bazarbay Mambetov: Since the day of our 
sovereignty, Uzbekistan has been selling natural gas at a 
special price of 42-50$ per one thousand of cubes meters. 
But this year, Uzbekistan stated that they would sell us 
gas for 100$ starting from January of next year. Based 
on my understanding, our government and other offi  cial 
bodies held negotiations but they failed to be successful. 
Yesterday gas-vending company stated that natural gas 
bills will increase by six soms for consumers starting from 
January 1st. Essentially, Uzbekistan wants to get closer 
to market prices and is following Russia’s example, which 
also started selling gas at high prices to its partners.
If appropriate negotiation processes were held, then 
Kyrgyzstan could have put gas supply on a special legal 
framework since we have many things in common 
with Uzbekistan, fi rst of all, water. For Uzbekistan, we 
collect, keep water and in summer provide enormous 
amount of water via Andizhan, Kirkidon, Papan, 
and Tortgul water reservoirs. Besides, eight major 
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channels have been fl owing from our territory into 
Uzbekistan providing water free of charge. These are 
small water reservoirs and minor channels. The most 
important, though, is the Toktogul water reservoir 
which is the Naryn River. For the last 20 years during the 
vegetation period from April 1st to October 1st we’ve 
been providing 7 billion cubes of water in average. 
BPC: At what price does Uzbekistan buy electric 
energy from us?
Bazarbay Mambetov:  During last 3 years, 
Uzbekistan has not been buying it referring to the 
fact that previous years were water-abound; they 
claim that lateral infl ow was suffi  cient to provide 
irrigation water for the whole territory of Uzbekistan. 
BPC: In other words, they are not buying electric 
power from us?
Bazarbay Mambetov:  There is an agreement between 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan from 
1998 about using water-energy resources of Syrdarya 
River basin wherein the Naryn River fl ows. Based on this 
agreement, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have to regularly 
buy annually produced power energy during the period 
of summer water outfl ows from Toktogul water reservoir. 
But Uzbekistan has not been buying it for the fourth year 
now, i.e., it withdrew from the agreement. Kazakhstan 
does not buy power on a regular basis either. According 
to the agreement, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan must buy 
2.2 billion kW/h at 1.1 cent per kW/h. They do not want 
to buy electricity, but want to continue receiving water.
If they do not buy power from our water reservoirs during 
summer releases of water, then we can stop producing 
energy and stop releasing water. To satisfy the electricity 
needs of Kyrgyzstan during vegetation period (April-
October), it is enough to produce just 2.7 billion of kW/h 
of energy. It is equivalent to releasing just 3 billion cubes 
of water through Toktogul water reservoir. This water will 
not be enough either for Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. To 
satisfy the water needs of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, we 
have to release from 6 to 7 billion cubes of water during 
vegetation period in summer, that is, twice as much. We 
would produce 5 billion kW/h to release 7 billion cubes of 
water. That is, apart from 2.7 billions of kW/h of power for 
our own needs, we would have 2.2 billion kW/h, which 
they should buy from us. If Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan 
do not buy the energy, thus ignoring the signed 
agreements, then Kyrgyzstan does not have to release 
extra water from its reservoirs during summer time. 
BPC: News agencies report that now Uzbekistan 
is raising prices for gas while demanding 
us to reduce the price for electric power? 
Bazarbay Mambetov:  Uzbekistan has not brought 
up this issue directly. As an expert, I can say that in 
past, during vegetation period, we used to sell to 
Uzbekistan electric power on overcharged prices of 
3,34 cents per kW/h, while to brotherly Kazakhstan 
we have been selling it at 1 cent since 1996. 
In order to increase the motivation to buy our cheap 
electric power during summer, we need to sell to 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on average for guaranteed 
prices of 2 cents. That is because the prime cost 
of produced electric power in Uzbekistan in new 
Angren hydro electric station is 2,2 cents per kW/h, 
and prime cost in Djambul hydro electric station of 
Kazakhstan is 2,3 cents per kW/h. Also, transportation 
costs and delivery to consumers must be taken into 
account. Thus, Uzbek and Kazakh electric powers 
make up 3,5 cents per kW/h for energy consumers. 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan think that they can always 
put pressure on us. Especially, Kazakhstan thinks so, 
suggesting we have no alternative. They think we are 
not able to keep the water for a long time; therefore, we 
will let the water out anyway. That is not quite correct 
though. We can keep all streams of the Naryn River at 
the cascade of Toktogul water reservoir both during 
winter and summer periods – and this would not be 
in the interests of either Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan. 
BPC: Why Kyrgyzstan is selling electric power 
at higher prices to Uzbekistan compared to 
Kazakhstan? Is it based on any agreements? 
Bazarbay Mambetov: In 1996 the government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic with the approval of the former president 
Askar Akaev made such a concession to Kazakhstan. 
They have decided to sell electric power to Kazakhstan 
for 1 cent, although in past they had to buy it for 3 cents. 
In response to that concession, Kazakhstan promised us 
to supply with Karaganda coal to Bishkek heating and 
power station for 16 USD per ton, including delivery. 
Later, they changed their mind concerning coal prices, 
but our prices remained as agreed. We are loosing 
greatly on prices, and our talentless management 
of energy networks is resulting in pitiable situation 
of Kyrgyz energy system. If in previous times 
we spoke of magnifi cence of the Kyrgyz energy 
system, today we talk about its misery and decline. 
BPC: What are the options for Kyrgyzstan 
to have eff ective negotiations with 
Uzbekistan? How should we work? 
Bazarbay Mambetov: First of all, we need to set up 
regular and constructive negotiations. We need to 
tell Uzbekistan that we understand its decision on gas 
prices: the world market conditions have stipulated 
prices for gas to be high. However, there are many things 
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that connect us with Uzbekistan besides water. We must 
reach an agreement in which we would guarantee the 
water supply to reservoirs and channels along the Rivers 
Naryn and Syrdariya. In exchange, Uzbekistan should buy 
energy from us, which is cheaper that Uzbek electricity. 
However, considering temporary economic hardships, 
Uzbekistan needs to understand clearly that 100 
USD per 1000 cubes meters of natural gas is quite 
burdensome for us. Therefore, we need to reach 
certain agreement with Uzbekistan. If we had some 
people able to lead such negotiations at the highest 
level, then I think Uzbekistan would understand us. 
BPC:   What could be the consequences of the increase 
for gas price today?
Bazarbay Mambetov: It would mean collapse of our 
all prognoses on infl ation. Because it means prices 
for food would increase, then prices for goods of daily 
usage would also increase; in a line it would aff ect 
other sectors. It all would result in new tension in the 
society, new possibility of protests and many other 
things. Of course, at one day we will reach world 
prices for gas, but not today. We are not ready yet; our 
fi nancial resources do not make it aff ordable for us. 
BPC:  Are there any alternatives for Kyrgyzstan to live 
without Uzbek gas?
Bazarbay Mambetov: Of course, there are. However, 
for this moment, we cannot use those alternatives. 
BPC: Why? 
Bazarbay Mambetov: Because our government is 
poor, the treasury is almost empty. Also, we are not able 
to use unutilized potential of hydro energy resources 
of Naryn, to build Kambarata-1, Kambarata-2 hydro 
stations in order to sell energy to all regions. In 2002 
we lived for four months without Uzbek gas: it was cut 
off  for non-payment. If there is no gas, we have coal. 
In past times, we used to be fairly called “stoker of Central 
Asia”. Today our state is in poor condition because we do 
not know how to extract coal in Kyzylkiya, Sulukta cities. 
We all know what is going on in Kara-Keche. There are 
many states who cannot aff ord the purchase of natural gas. 
However, on the other hand, if government had enough 
fi nancial resources and it invited private sector as a partner 
in extracting oil and gas, we could ease the tension. 
BPC:  In one of your interviews to local mass media you 
said that Toktogul hydro electric station is planned to 
be closed. Would you please give more details about it? 
Bazarbay Mambetov: One thing when a simple person 
talks about water resources of Toktogul water reservoir, 
and it is totally another thing when state offi  cial talks about 
it. Our state representative has said that after one or two 
years we will stop the operation of Toktogul hydro electric 
station because we have used all reserved water there. 
However, one must not frighten citizens this way. In 
average during last 25 years the infl ow to Toktogul 
water reservoir via Naryn River was 12,7 billion cubes 
per year, which would mean water outfl ow would be 
12,2 billion cubes. Out of it, from April 1 – October 1 
in average 7,1 billion cubes were released annually. 
Releasing this water, we used to meet the domestic 
demand and sell electric energy to Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. In autumn and winter, we produced in 
average 5 billion cubes per year during these 25 years. 
If in summer Uzbekistan does not buy electric energy 
from us, and backs up from mentioned agreement of 
1998, then we can stop producing electric energy for 
Uzbekistan and supplying this water during summer. 
Therefore, we could save 3 billion cubes which would 
cover Uzbekistan’s territory. It means the water will 
stay in Toktogul water reservoir both during winter 
and summer, without decreasing and increasing, with 
the consideration of infl ows and outfl ows. It would 
make up approximately 17, 5 billion cubic meters. 
If to take world experience, there is an example of 
Euphrates River. Persians built 20 water reservoirs 
there, which stay fi lled up all the year round. 
BPC:  You mentioned that we used to release 12 billion 
cubic meters per year. How much do we release now?
Bazarbay Mambetov: Last year the leadership of our 
energy companies has been selling energy to Russia almost 
for nothing. The population of Kyrgyzstan buys electric 
power from domestic companies for 1,5 cents, and Russia 
for 0, 65 cents per kW/h. It is unbelievable and unfair! 
Thus we kept producing electric power in Toktogul hydro 
energy station, and letting water out. The main reason 
why Uzbekistan decided not to purchase electric power 
during summer time is that it was convinced that we 
would sell electric power to Russia for 1,5 cents and let 
the water out. Thus, Uzbekistan could get this water for 
free. Everything was calculated. Now we have huge debt 
payable to Uzbekistan for gas, for its transportation via 
pipeline “Kaztransgaz”. This debt is a result of the fact that 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan stopped regularly buying 
electric power, which was produced during summer 
outfl ows of water from Toktogul water reservoirs. 
They put political and economic pressure on us. 
Recently, there was a business forum in Urumchi, and I 
was the moderator in the session on the energy sector. 
Other businessmen were surprised by our approach 
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in using our energy resources: we have electric power, 
gas, oil, coal, and we do not want to develop them. 
We need to work very closely with private sector. 
BPC:  In long term how the problems in the energy 
system could be addressed? 
Bazarbay Mambetov: Today the problem of energy 
sector is a problem of management. The tragedy of 
our state and government is its inability to provide 
energy sector with eff ective management. Forty percent 
of produced energy goes to so-called commercial 
losses. Toktogul hydro electric station works almost 
for free. Unless we invite private sector to construction 
of Kambarata-1, ensure eff ective management of 
Toktogul hydro electric station and fi ve cascades, 
we will never be able to establish an order in energy. 
Kyrgyzstan must have stable water and energy 
policy in Central Asia. Control over water resources 
must be seen as a key element of future power of 
Kyrgyzstan. We must infl uence the Central Asian politics.
Roundtable summary
Tripartism as a prerequisite for the development of socially responsible 
business
On December 12, 2006, the Institute for Public 
Policy hosted an expert discussion on “Tripartism as a 
prerequisite for the development of socially responsible 
business” with the participation of local experts.
The enhancement and development of social partnership 
between the state, employer, and employee on an equal 
basis is one of the main requirements for constructive 
resolution of contradictions between the subjects of 
social and labor relations. However, there are important 
questions regarding what necessities and preconditions 
exist for the development of tripartite relations. 
Participants of the discussion highlighted that the state 
has not been playing its role in the development of 
social-labor relations. For the last fi ve to six years, it has 
been trying to abandon its function of management 
instead of setting and protecting adequate rules of 
the game. The rhetoric about “socially responsible” 
business has become nothing but an attempt to shift 
the responsibility from the state to business. The current 
situation demonstrates that the state lacks, fi rst of all, a 
clear understanding of the role of business in the state 
economy, and secondly, a clear understanding of how 
the state should help and foster domestic business.
It was also stated that the “employer” component in 
the “state-employer-employee” triad is practically 
missing in legal terms. The character of the current 
legislation is coercive and punitive, and does nothing 
to protect the employer. There is no business index 
in the country, which is related to the fact that the 
state has been allowing the “rule of the telephone 
call” instead of establishing and enforcing standard 
and commonly accepted rules of the game.
The introduction and development of tripartite 
relations would promote the protection and 
development of business - the main employer and 
creator of jobs. Only when they are confi dent about 
their future can businesses serve as a stimulator 
of the economic development of the country. 
The “employee” component, represented by trade unions 
(“profsoyuzy”), has not been playing its proper role 
either. Such unions remain a part of the state, and their 
activities essentially come down to the protection of 
their property. Still, it was stated that the very existence 
of labor unions provides an opportunity, if they are 
appropriately reformed for an eff ective representation 
of employees in the “state-employer-employee” triad.
Experts identifi ed two main challenges for the 
development of tripartism in the country. Firstly, there 
is a very weak tradition and culture of social dialogue 
in the country. Not long ago, the state served as both 
a regulator of social-labor relations and an employer, 
while representatives of employee’s interests – trade 
unions – were basically part of the Communist party. 
Secondly, in the current situation, in which the state is 
weak and corrupt, business is vulnerable legally and 
employees are extremely dependent on employers due 
to a high unemployment rate.  Under such circumstances, 
there are serious doubts about the readiness of parties 
to establish and maintain tripartite communication.
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The SCO as a Project for a Zone of Mutual Responsibility and Development
The SCO as a Project for a Zone of Mutual Responsibility and 
Development
Muratbek Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public Policy 
Excerpt from a report presented by Professor Imanaliev, President of the Institute for Public 
Policy, at the international conference “SCO: Results and Prospects” on November 30, 2006, Almaty.
Defi nition of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s 
geographic zone is quite easy –the territories of 
its member states. However, it is clear that such a 
geographical defi nition cannot be considered as the 
SCO’s zone of interests. Obviously, the organization’s 
interests include Central Asia, and possibly the southern 
adjacent neighbors of Central Asia, primarily Afghanistan. 
In this context, not only China and Russia have interests in 
Central Asia, but also the U.S. Furthermore, the interests 
of China and Russia in other regions of the world do not 
entirely coincide with the zone of interests of the SCO. 
In declarative form, the zone of interests could be 
considered a zone of the SCO’s responsibility. In my opinion, 
nobody is trying to make a secret of this orientation. The 
issue is only about the way it is structured in terms of 
organizational and political principles, and in terms of 
the aggregation of interests of all SCO member-states. 
 
In the context of the above-mentioned points, the 
Central Asian states are seen not only as subjects of 
the organization, but also as objects of the eff orts put 
into the SCO, mainly by Russia and China. Additionally, 
the SCO has one signifi cant and unique feature 
– the smaller the country, the less developed (and 
slower developing) it is, including per capital criteria. 
This feature is one of the reasons why the Central Asian 
states are inclined to consider relations with the U.S. not 
within the framework of SCO-U.S.A, but in the framework 
of triadic U.S.A.-China-Russia relations. Such a framework 
of constructing relations is dominant. Moreover, obvious 
latent problems in the relations of latter two powers are 
aff ecting SCO’s operation to a certain degree. Besides, 
there are some contradictions within the Central 
Asian states. It is for this reason that cooperation and 
partnership within the same international organization 
is accompanied by competition. This tension is 
not surprising however, as all interstate unions are 
characterized by the same phenomenon: the European 
Union, ASEAN, and many others. The question is, 
what is prevalent both in the activities of SCO itself 
and of its member-states: common interests, or the 
preferences of each individual state? Is the SCO is a zone 
of common interests for the security and development 
of all, or does each member-state fi ght on its own? 
For the time being, along with a certain degree 
of progress, there are also many problems 
and contradictions in the activities of SCO. 
 
One of the major contradictions is a confl ict over 
the  declared principles of cooperation, both within 
the framework of the SCO itself, and with the states 
and organizations that lie beyond the borders of 
the SCO and the interests of its participating states. 
In particular, there are issues with the well-known 
SCO principle of openness. It is great that the SCO is 
building business relations with the European Union, 
ASEAN, Collective Security Treaty Organization, EvrAzEs, 
and other international organizations. However, the 
strange thing is there are no relations with the U.S.A. 
and NATO. The latter took the responsibility for the 
development of the situation and, fi nally, for the destiny 
of Afghanistan, the country which presents the most 
acute problems for the security of Central Asia. It is 
obvious that the security issues of the regions cannot 
be resolved without America, for the time being at least. 
Besides, the U.S.A. has established a direct presence 
not only in Afghanistan, but also in Central Asia. 
Each SCO member-state has its own scheme of relations 
with Washington (even those states which did not want 
to have any), but the SCO as a whole lacks contacts 
with the U.S.A., even in the form of basic consultations. 
Such an approach to partnership with the U.S.A. and 
NATO complicates the implementation of another 
declared SCO principle – the principle of corporation 
or consolidation, especially for Central Asian states. 
Bilateral Russian-American and Chinese-American 
negotiations and consultations regarding security in 
Central Asia have likely been causing bewilderment, 
if not a sense distrust, among Central Asian states. 
Also, it is important to take into account that the 
situation in Afghanistan is worsening (it is known that 
the Taliban has taken under its control almost 70% of 
Afghanistan’s territory), and I believe that it is in the 
SCO’s interests to begin consultation with America 
on this issue. It is time for such a step, especially given 
Washington’s interest in building contacts with the SCO. 
 
Also, I would like to say few words about the relations of 
the SCO with the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
and EvrAzEs. One might think that such a partnership 
has meaning. However, the participation of CIS 
states, all of whom are members of the SCO except 
Belarus and Armenia, in the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and EvrAzEs makes one think that SCO 
states are negotiating among each other primarily, and 
then separately with China. In addition, commitments 
taken by participating states in the framework of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization and EvrAzEs 
have a certain infl uence on their stance in the SCO. 
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The SCO as a Project for a Zone of Mutual Responsibility and Development
The only positive aspect is that still there have not been 
any obvious contradictions or problems in the positions of 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization, EvrAzEs, and 
SCO. Such a format of cooperation between the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization, EvrAzEs, and SCO seems 
like a protective construction from excessive activeness 
on the part of China. From the point of view of those CIS 
countries who are members of the SCO, such an approach 
might be justifi ed. In that case however, it will be quite 
challenging to construct a zone of joint responsibility 
and development within the framework of the SCO. 
A separate issue is the admission of new members into 
the SCO. Apparently, no member-states are against 
seeing such respected countries as India, Pakistan 
and Iran enter into the SCO. The important question 
however is: for what purposes would these countries 
like to be SCO participants? Accepting the SCO Charter, 
internal regulations, and program documents of the 
SCO, are these countries indeed ready for the project of 
forming a zone of mutual responsibility? Undoubtedly, 
these issues concern Iran the most, the membership of 
which would strengthen an anti-American component 
in the SCO’s image, although it is worth recognizing 
that anti-Americanism is currently turning into a 
trend – actively spreading in the developing world 
as a result of the insuffi  ciently thought-out foreign 
policy of Washington. Are the SCO and each of its 
participating countries, Kyrgyzstan for example, ready 
to take responsibility for the nuclear policy of Iran and 
the possible deterioration of Iran-American relations?
If we consider SCO activities in view of an 
organizational-methodological sequence and political 
hierarchy – “intentions-planning-implementation-
prospects” – currently, only two aspects are clear 
and well-defi ned: intentions and prospects.
 
1. Intentions, both public and unpublicized, are indeed 
optimistic and transparent. From this point of view, 
they seem to be relevant and useful for all Central-Asian 
states without any exceptions. Economic development 
can progress much faster in close cooperation with 
such economic giants as Russia and China, which, 
moreover, have decent political weight, than it 
could alone or even in a “purely Central-Asian team.”
Active, productive economic cooperation only within 
the SCO will allow the Central-Asian states to take 
serious steps in the development of their economies. 
2. Planning in the economic sphere is complicated by 
a high level of bureaucracy and excessive regulation of 
activity, exacerbated by yet-to-be-agreed-upon bilateral 
relations (in some cases multilateral) on SCO territory.
Excellent and fairly promising projects, including the 
Business Council, Economic Forum, Interbank Association, 
Forum for the Scientifi c Community and other structures of 
the “secondary echelon” may become shallow and useless 
accessories to summits if they are not brought to life. 
In Bishkek in 2004, SCO members agreed about 
joining their eff orts on 6 priorities: 1) transport, 2) 
energy, 3) electricity, 4) agriculture, 5) production 
of household appliances, and 6) light and heavy 
manufacturing industry. A program for trade and 
economic cooperation until 2020 was approved.
It is quite obvious that all six of these priorities are, fi rst 
of all, important for the Central Asian states. However, 
it is worth recognizing that further promotion of these 
projects is being impeded by internal contradictions in 
the uncoordinated stances of SCO countries. The same 
is true about the activity of the SCO in cultural and 
humanitarian partnership, as well as in information work.
3. For the purposes of project and program 
implementation, various types of special groups have 
been created. The latest ones are special groups on the fuel 
and energy industry and information and communication 
technologies, formed during the Tashkent meeting. So 
far, none of these projects have been implemented.
Analysis of the trends in cooperative development (the 
movement from intentions to implementation) shows 
a shift from the dominance of common interests at 
the stage of intentions to the dominance of individual 
(country) interests at the stage of the implementation.
On August 24th, a meeting of the ministers responsible 
for the foreign policy of SCO states was held in Tashkent. 
The main purpose of the meeting was to prepare for 
the summit of Prime-Ministers. However, aside from 
declaratory statements touching upon the realization of 
projects and programs, nothing signifi cant was signed. 
At the meeting of Prime-Ministers in Dushanbe, we heard 
old and new intentions, statements about the need to 
revive cooperation and about the forms and methods of its 
implementation. We also heard about bright prospects for 
trade, as well as for economic and cultural-humanitarian 
partnership. Still, nothing went beyond these statements. 
Meanwhile, activity is more dynamic within bilateral 
agreements, although it is worth highlighting that the 
infl uence of SCO agreements on this type of partnership, 
though indirect, has been observed nonetheless.
It is obvious that dynamic advancement towards the 
creation of a mutual responsibility and development 
zone mainly depends on Russia and China.
The Central Asian states should become more 
active in the SCO as well; it is necessary not only to 
express their opinions and intentions, but also to 
be more active in program implementation. Among 
all existing and possible future intergovernmental 
organizations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
remains the most promising and eff ective one.
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Certain Aspects of Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Policy in 2006
Erlan Abdyldaev, Expert of the Institute for Public Policy, former Ambassador of the Kyrgyz 
Republic to People’s Republic of China
Regrettably, the year 2006 has not become a year 
of stabilization of the internal political situation in 
Kyrgyzstan. “Stable instability,” heightened political 
tension was noted as before, the struggle for power 
continued with the help of various techniques and 
methods, including “street democracy” and “matryoshka 
gate”, which became internationally known. At the 
end of the year, in November-December, political 
tension reached its zenith, having led to unjustifi ably 
swift change of the Constitution, which in the end due 
to multiple legal confl icts in the new wording of the 
country’s Basic Law and lack of mutual good will among 
both confl icting sides, led to the resignation of the 
Cabinet and questioned further existence of the current 
membership of parliament. These developments on 
the eve of the New Year again put the country before 
another political crisis, and the forecasted exacerbation 
of the situation, which will possibly be accompanied 
by new parliamentary elections and forming of a new 
Cabinet, now will obviously leap over into the year 2007.
The political year again vividly demonstrated that 
lacking real, not formal, political compromise between 
the authorities, opposition and civil society, lacking 
a common aspiration for moving forward in the 
highest interests of the state, not personal, group or 
clan, the unfolding volatile situation in the country 
clearly becomes of “chronic” nature, moving from 
year to year and in the end further postponing the 
exit of Kyrgyzstan from political and economic crisis. 
After the well-known events of March 24, 2005 advanced 
credit of trust by the international community in the 
new leadership with Kurmanbek Bakiev at the head 
was very high. Still available and not fully spent at 
present the resource potential of such kind of relations 
in 2006 could bring Kyrgyzstan quite good political 
and other dividends on the assumption of competent 
use as well as strict and constructive demonstration 
of the most important elements of domestic politics.
Thus, conducting constitutional, administrative, 
economic reforms by the leadership of Kyrgyzstan 
during the past year, real reduction of the level of 
corruption, fi ght against organized crime, including 
harsh counteraction to attempts of criminals to 
integrate into government as well as fi rm determination 
to solve other crisis problems could add a signifi cant 
“capital” not only to the domestic but also to fl exible 
foreign policy maneuvering. However, unfortunately, 
in 2006 the leadership of Kyrgyzstan, fully preoccupied 
with the struggle for power, could neither resolve the 
abovementioned problems nor indicate fundamental 
approaches to their solution, giving Kyrgyzstan 
increasingly an image of an unstable state in the eyes of 
foreign partners. Lack of predictability and consistency 
in making decisions on domestic and foreign policy 
issues by the top leadership of the country is becoming 
more and more problematic for foreign policy partners.
All year long continuous fi erce domestic struggle 
for power in Kyrgyzstan in certain sense objectively 
put off  solution of foreign policy problems. Activity, 
determination and eff ectiveness of the leadership in 
foreign policy languished, and stability in maintaining 
and pursuing foreign policy priorities lacked. This 
circumstance often led to foreign policy discourses 
which undoubtedly could have a long-term negative 
impact on relations of Kyrgyzstan with the outside world.
In the unfolding diffi  cult domestic political situation 
in 2006, under increasing pressure by western states, 
which expressed certain dissatisfaction with the course 
of democratic reforms, political leadership of Kyrgyzstan 
apparently made a forced and perhaps expectable 
focus on strengthening relations with its traditional 
and more “familiar” partners, mainly neighbors and CIS 
member states. At the same time, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Organization of Collective Security 
Treaty, Eurasian Economic Community, and Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) were named as priority 
international and regional organizations in statements 
of the top leadership of Kyrgyzstan. In his address 
to the people of Kyrgyzstan on September 28, 2006, 
President Bakiev said about completion of the work on 
development of a new foreign policy strategy of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, which according to him contained the 
necessary corrections, and suggested to Jogorku Kenesh 
(Parliament) to adopt it as a law. However, the draft of 
that document was not discussed in the parliament 
or released for the public till the end of the year.
Slowdown or, to be frank, rollback of democratic 
transformations, especially issues around constitutional 
reform and general democratic values, uncertainty and 
frequent changes of position regarding the American 
airbase, expulsion of American diplomats and a general 
deterioration of relations with the U.S., problems with 
the Uzbek refugees, periodic criticism on the part 
of certain politicians of the border agreement with 
China, the issue of joining the HIPC Initiative, which 
aggravated by the end of the year, water resources 
and border problems with neighbors – this is an 
incomplete list of problems of the Kyrgyz leadership 
with foreign policy partners in 2006. Moreover, there 
was a clear lack of unity of opinions of the top political 
leadership regarding a number of abovementioned 
problems. However, still more alarming is the fact that 
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often domestic and generally natural disagreement 
in the top Kyrgyz leadership became known to mass 
media and public long before principled decisions were 
made, hurting the foreign policy image of Kyrgyzstan
The infi rmity of Kurmanbek Bakiev in his offi  ce, to the 
point of potential threat of pre-term resignation from 
presidency during the course of 2006 under pressure 
of the opposition, coupled with his pronouncements 
on foreign policy led to a situation whereby the 
majority of foreign policy partners of Kyrgyzstan 
preferred to take a largely wait-and-see attitude 
by carefully stating their interests or freezing their 
relations with Bishkek at a marginally suffi  cient level. 
It is indicative that in 2006 no delegation headed by 
a president or prime minister has visited Kyrgyzstan. 
Heads of states and governments who toured Central 
Asian states preferred not to visit Bishkek last year.
On the other hand, a number of experts note that a foreign 
policy direction of “returning Kyrgyzstan home to Central 
Asia”, made by Kurmanbek Bakiev in the beginning of his 
presidency, started getting realized but, unfortunately, 
in a negative manner for Bishkek. The realm of foreign 
policy for President Bakiev within this framework really 
starts narrowing down to relations with the Russian 
Federation, Central Asian neighbors, certain CIS member 
states, and as an exception, with Iran and Turkey. 
 
Activity of Kyrgyzstan at present in other important 
directions – American, European, and Asian – could 
hardly be called positive and eff ective. Further 
mechanical and one-sided adherence to realization of 
the abovementioned, in principle, explainable direction 
on the part of Bishkek could lead to destruction of the 
balance of interests of outside forces in Kyrgyzstan, falling 
into dependence from one pole, which could eventually 
lead to the loss of independence in foreign aff airs.
A tendency of Bishkek’s departure from the policy 
of multiple vectors and transition to domination 
of primarily one – northern – vector in foreign 
policy orientations and personal passions of 
the top leadership could be observed today.
Notwithstanding persistent eff orts of the Kyrgyz 
leadership and personally President Bakiev on 
rapprochement with the foreign policy partner number 
one – Russia, Kyrgyz-Russian relations regrettably 
did not develop further. The parties, primarily the 
top leaders, most likely still could not overcome the 
syndrome of non-fulfi llment by the Kyrgyz side of its 
promises, in particular, “the Astana statement of the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization” (July 2005) on the 
American airbase. On the eve of his fi rst offi  cial visit to 
Russia in April 2006, President Bakiev made an attempt 
to remedy the situation and win back sympathies of 
the Russian leadership by once again laying down the 
U.S. a rigid ultimatum on signifi cant raise of the rent for 
the airbase or its withdrawal. However, Moscow treated 
this gesture of Bakiev in a rather lukewarm manner, 
and immediately reacted through Yuri Baluevsky, 
Chief of the Joint Staff  of the Russian Defense Ministry, 
who said that Russia does not view deployment of 
the American airbase in Kyrgyzstan as a problem. 
According to offi  cial information of both sides, the 
main goal of the visit of President Bakiev to the Russian 
Federation, which took place in April 24-25, 2006, was 
to elevate “bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level 
– concrete defi nition of mutually benefi cial cooperation, 
primarily in the trade and economic sphere.” It was also 
reported that during the visit there was a discussion 
of realization of specifi c business projects in oil 
and gas sphere, power engineering, transport with 
participation of major Russian companies, as well as 
the topic of cooperation in the sphere of migration and 
interaction in the sphere of culture and humanities. 
However, no breakthrough agreements or contracts 
were signed in the abovementioned spheres; the 
parties did not go beyond protocols of intentions. By 
the end of 2006, realization of the abovementioned 
protocols important for Kyrgyzstan’s economy was 
not observed. Interests of Russia, not Kyrgyzstan, were 
refl ected in the joint document signed as a result of 
Bakiev’s visit to Russia, especially in the section dealing 
with the military presence of Moscow in Kyrgyzstan, 
which is apparently the main interest and a structural 
element of the entire Russian policy in Kyrgyzstan. 
During the past year there were visits of Russian 
Defense Minister Ivanov, Head of the Russian Agency 
for Atomic Power and Co-Chair of the Russian-
Kyrgyz Intergovernmental Commission Kirienko to 
Kyrgyzstan as well as the visit of Prime Minister Kulov 
to Moscow. However, they also did not bring about 
any progress in trade, economic or other directions 
of cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan.
A new irritant in Kyrgyz-Russian relations has suddenly 
emerged in the middle of the last year. There were 
reports in Kyrgyz mass media about supposedly transient 
visit of Boris Berezovsky in Bishkek and his meetings 
with some Kyrgyz offi  cials. Notwithstanding denial by 
offi  cial Bishkek and personally Bakiev of the fact of the 
visit of President Putin’s major opponent to Kyrgyzstan, 
Russian Offi  ce of Prosecutor General confi rmed this 
fact, which obviously did not promote establishment or 
restoration of mutual trust between leaders of two states.
Developments around the American airbase and 
Kyrgyz-American relations in general in 2006 were 
noted by experts as the most signifi cant, and which had 
a substantial infl uence on relations of Kyrgyzstan with 
other foreign policy partners during the last year. Given 
the lack of economic interests in Kyrgyzstan, virtually 
zero commodity turnover and American investments, 
U.S. interests in the country mainly lie in the military-
political sphere and promotion of democratic reforms. 
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For Washington, the American airbase at “Manas” airport 
is a key element of not so much American-Kyrgyz relations 
but rather US military-political interests in the entire 
Central Asian region. This is what most likely explains 
the signifi cant restraint showed by the U.S. during 
repeated changes of positions of the Kyrgyz leadership 
on this issue, including an ultimatum made in April 2006 
on revision of the agreement regarding the terms of 
the deployment of the airbase. Negotiations initiated 
by Bishkek with the US on further use of the airbase 
in “Manas” airport by the forces of the Anti-Terrorist 
Coalition in Afghanistan were completed in July 2006. 
Upon the completion of negotiations Miroslav Niyazov, 
Secretary of the Security Council of Kyrgyzstan and 
James McDougall, Deputy Assistant for the U.S. Defense 
Minister signed a protocol, according to which the U.S. 
is going to provide over 150 million USD as a general 
assistance and compensation during the next year after 
ratifi cation by the U.S. Congress. However, this issue is not 
completely resolved and still will remain the main issue 
on the agenda of Kyrgyz-American relations in 2007.
The “cold spell” of bilateral Kyrgyz-American relations 
was also aff ected by a sudden declaration of two 
American diplomats persona non grata in the second 
half of the last year. The murder of a Kyrgyz citizen in 
“Gansi” airbase in early December, which caused a 
justifi ed indignation of the Kyrgyz public, served a fi nal 
blow to the Kyrgyz-American relations in the last year.
At this state, Kyrgyz-American relations will have to 
withstand serious tests in 2007, and their adjustment 
apparently will require quite serious eff orts on both 
sides, and desire and capability of the leadership of 
two states to take into account each other’s interests. 
The state visit of President Bakiev to the People’s Republic 
of China, which refl ected all problems and nuances of the 
countries’ relations during the last year, became the main 
event in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations in 2006. Expectations 
of Beijing regarding the visit were connected primarily 
to the political component of the cooperation. The top 
Chinese leadership tried to clarify as much as possible 
not only the position of President Bakiev regarding key 
issues of bilateral relations, regional and international 
politics but also its fi rmness and invariability in the long 
term. In general Beijing was interested in the possibility 
of restoring the atmosphere of political trust between 
the leadership of two states, which staggered to a certain 
degree after events of March 24, 2005. In Kyrgyz-Chinese 
relations, the level of political trust between the top 
leaders and the extent of cooperation in the sphere of 
security have always defi ned and will defi ne the dynamics 
of relations in other spheres, primarily in trade and 
economic sphere, realization of major economic projects. 
Acknowledgement of continuity and fi rm adherence 
of the new Kyrgyz leadership to earlier accords and 
agreements, primarily of political essence, including the 
settlement of border issues were the main elements of 
Bakiev’s visit to PRC. Offi  cial statement of Kyrgyzstan’s new 
President during the visit about fi rm adherence to all the 
hitherto concluded accords and agreements, including 
the border agreement, despite domestic opponents, 
was viewed by Beijing as a signifi cant step towards 
restoration of the atmosphere of political mutual trust.
The issue of American military presence in Kyrgyzstan 
in immediate proximity to Chinese border was also 
an important aspect on the political agenda of 
negotiations of Bakiev in Beijing. During the visit 
the Chinese leadership unambiguously advocated 
determination of time limits for the deployment of the 
American airbase in “Manas” and against expansion 
of its mandate beyond the framework of the anti-
terrorist operation in Afghanistan. Apparently, Beijing 
managed to persuade the Kyrgyz side in validity of its 
position and enlisted its support. Regarding this issue 
in the joint fi nal declaration, the parties stated that they 
“will not allow third countries the use of their territory 
to the detriment of the state sovereignty, security and 
territorial integrity of the other side, and will not allow 
creation and activity on its territory of organizations 
and associations which pose threats to sovereignty, 
security and territorial integrity of the other side.”
The economic component of President Bakiev’s visit to 
PRC by any measure was not the main one on the agenda 
of negotiations, and as a result, despite statements of 
certain Kyrgyz politicians, no breakthrough decisions 
were made in this regard. China, which does not view 
Kyrgyzstan as a priority economic partner in the region, 
restricted itself to giving a traditional grant worth 70 
million yuans to support the Kyrgyz economy and a 
government loan for the construction of a cement works 
in Kyzyl-Kia, a town in the south of Kyrgyzstan. As for the 
priority economic projects for Kyrgyzstan – construction 
of a China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railroad and export of 
Kyrgyz electric power to PRC, which have been at the stage 
of studies and discussion for the past years, the Chinese 
leadership as it was assumed suggested to additionally 
study them, which could mean that at present there is 
lack of interest in their implementation on their part.
In general President Bakiev’s visit to PRC was largely 
political and was aimed at completing the protracted pause 
in Kyrgyz-Chinese relations, which appeared after March 
24, 2005. Notwithstanding absence of breakthrough 
decisions in the economic sphere, which would be 
highly unrealistic at present, it should be acknowledged 
that the goal – restoration in a certain sense of the 
political trust between the leaderships of two states – in 
principle was achieved, and could be considered as the 
most important and main result of Bakiev’s visit to China. 
Offi  cial visits of President Bakiev during the last year to 
the states of the Central Asian region – to Kazakhstan 
(July) and Uzbekistan (October ) – were of signifi cance to 
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him from the point of view of acknowledgement of his 
status as a new legitimate leader of a neighboring state 
by the political elites of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
The stated goals of the visits – stimulation and solution 
of problems in bilateral political, trade, economic and 
humanitarian relations – in general were not achieved. 
Water, fuel-energy, border, migration, property and a 
number of other bilateral problems with Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan could have been hardly resolved during one 
visit. According to estimates of experts and participants 
of negotiations, both visits were mainly about “overture” 
of positions and search for possible compromises. 
At the same time, following an established tradition 
upon completion of a “successful” visit to Uzbekistan, 
the Kyrgyz side received a notifi cation from Tashkent 
on raising gas prices in 2007 approximately by 50%.
Relations of Kyrgyzstan with other foreign policy 
partners – EU member states, Japan, Asian and Arab 
states – in 2006 were not active and remained at the 
previous level. During the last year the parties exchanged 
seldom visits, the highest level being ministerial. 
Positions of Kyrgyzstan during the past year within the 
framework of multilateral diplomacy in general remained 
without changes. The attitude towards the HIPC 
Initiative, UN reform, and chairmanship in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization could be noted as the most 
important issues for the leadership of Kyrgyzstan in 
international and regional organizations in 2006, and 
which could infl uence both positively and negatively 
domestic and foreign policy position of Kyrgyzstan. 
The fi nal decision on the fi rst issue, which caused 
heightened tension in the country, has been postponed 
to March 2007; however, judging by the statements 
of the prime minister and key ministers, the issue has 
been basically resolved in favor of joining the Initiative. 
Regarding the second issue, during the last year mainly 
China and Japan, whose interests clashed over UN 
reform, tried to put pressure on Bishkek with the aim of 
getting hold of its vote when it comes to voting. Voting 
on the UN reform has been postponed to a later date, 
which however does not eliminate the issue of making a 
diffi  cult decision by the Kyrgyz leadership in favor of one 
or another option for UN reform, which refl ect interests 
of key world powers. Chairmanship in the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization and accordingly hosting the 
next summit of the heads of states in 2007 has passed 
on to Kyrgyzstan according to the organization’s Charter 
by way of rotation in alphabetical order. Kyrgyzstan is 
given a good chance this year to promote its interests 
within the organization, improve bilateral relations with 
members and observers of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization and try to show Kyrgyzstan favorably to the 
entire world during the days of the work of the Summit.
In conclusion it should be noted that the entire sequence 
of events which took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2006 again 
confi rms that under an impaired and unstable leadership, 
stagnating economy and general unsteady internal 
political situation in the country, there cannot be a strong 
and purposeful foreign policy. All of the above negative 
factors were present in Kyrgyzstan during the last year. 
At this conjuncture, President Bakiev made eff orts of 
maneuvering on foreign policy fi eld, which was getting 
narrower as a result of his politics, trying to enlist support 
of above all Russia and China as well as the next-door 
neighbors with the aim of strengthening his positions as 
a legitimate President of Kyrgyzstan and solving internal 
economic problems of Kyrgyzstan. However, it should be 
admitted that from the point of view of the immediate 
and medium-term future, President Bakiev’s last year 
stake on preferred development of relations with one 
pole – Russian Federation could hardly compensate 
sharply defi ned cold spell in relations with western 
countries, primarily with the U.S. in 2006. Taking this into 
account, not many achievements in the sphere of foreign 
policy in 2006 could be claimed by President Bakiev.
Roundtable summary
Management of Water Resources in Kyrgyzstan
The discussion was summoned in light of an 
increasingly tense situation in the energy sector, 
continuing disputes about the role of water resources 
in geopolitics, the increasing engagement of external 
players interested in the water-energy complex of the 
country, and the obvious absence of a clear and coherent 
strategy on the part of the government in this sphere. 
The experts pointed out that the main issue is 
regulation of the joint usage of water resources 
by Central Asian states, in particular Kyrgyzstan, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Currently, about 75% of 
the waters of Syrdarya River are formed on the territory 
of Kyrgyzstan, while it uses only 10% of them, which 
makes up about four billion cubic meters of water.
“Based on international conventions, Kyrgyzstan 
has the right to thirteen billion cubic meters of water, 
On December 15, 2006, the Institute for Public Policy hosted a round table on “The Problems of Water Resource 
Management in Kyrgyzstan.” Turdakun Usubaliev, former chairman of the Kyrgyz Communist Party, Duishen 
Mamatkanov, director of the Institute for Water Issues and Hydroelectric Energy, Bazarbai Mambetov, President of 
the Association of Oil Traders and Former Deputy Prime Minister, and Jumakadyr Akeneev, Professor of Economics 
at the Kyrgyz National University and Former Minister of Agriculture and Water Resources were invited as speakers. 
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twenty billion cubic meters if we include household and 
industrial use,” stated Duishen Mamatkanov, Director of 
the Institute for Water Issues and Hydroelectric Energy. 
A separate issue is the compensation of expenses 
to Kyrgyzstan for maintaining water-irrigation facilities 
of regional importance. Based on the information of 
Turdakun Usubaliev, the maintenance of the irrigation 
systems costs twenty-fi ve million USD (based on the 
prices of 2001), ten million of which is Kyrgyzstan’s share, 
while fi fteen million should be covered by Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan. The construction of the Toktogul water 
reservoir fl ooded twenty-eight thousand hectares of 
land, but, as Duishen Mamatkanov noted, “we have 
received nothing from our neighbors, and we pay forty-six 
million soms to Toktogul raion as partial compensation.”
The 2001 law of the Kyrgyz Republic “On 
intergovernmental use of water resources and 
water facilities of the Kyrgyz Republic” enshrines 
the state’s right of property on water resources and 
water facilities within its territory, and stipulates the 
funding of intergovernmental water programs on 
a parity or cost-share basis. As Turdakun Usubaliev 
stated, while Kazakhstan recognizes the legitimacy 
of this law, and has even paid compensation at 
some points, Uzbekistan continues to reject it. 
Another important component of the problem is 
the lack of a strategic policy on the part of the state 
regarding the management of water resources. The 
President of the Oil Traders’ Association of Kyrgyzstan, 
former Deputy Prime-Minister Bazarbai Mambetov, 
stated that Kyrgyzstan is loosing its weight in Central 
Asia only because it cannot wisely use its resources.
A National Council on Water and Energy was created 
in May 2006, involving several well-known experts in the 
fi eld, specifi cally for the development of a state strategy 
in the water-energy sphere. However, the fi rst meeting 
on May 4, 2006 turned out to be its last meeting, as 
the Council was abolished by a presidential decree.
Another issue is absence of a single body responsible 
for managing water resources. The water resources 
of Naryn and Syrdarya are managed by the open joint 
stock company “Electric Stations,” while small rivers 
belong to the department of water economy within the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Processing Industry. 
As an example, Professor Jumakadyr Akeneev noted that 
negotiations on gas prices with Uzbekistan are led by 
representatives of Kyrgyzgas, who have no affi  liation with 
water and energy issues, though it is clear that gas supply 
is closely related to water and energy for Kyrgyzstan. 
Participants of the round table came to the 
conclusion that development of a clear water 
management policy requires a continuation of 
discussions on this issue in a wider circle of experts.
